Europe's ammunition gap: The urgent call for rearmament
"It's the economy, stupid!"—the slogan under which American President Bill Clinton rose to power—seems, with a slight modification, to be a good guideline for the governments of European countries. When Fukuyama's "end of history" turned out to be a mirage of the long-gone 1990s, the continent's secure future may depend on implementing a short plan. It can be summed up in two words: "ammunition, stupid!".
The war in Ukraine is consuming ammunition in quantities unimaginable for decades. Although expert analyses—such as forecasts from the American think tank RAND—have long pointed to the risk of a full-scale conflict, the West has almost entirely disarmed itself in the 21st century, building armies more capable of expeditionary operations than fighting on European territory.
This was made easier by the fact that the armed forces became an easy means of seeking budget savings. For years, cuts in costly development programs, research work, and equipment orders were the European norm.
The war in Ukraine abruptly reminded Europe of an old principle: "If you want peace, prepare for war," as the famous Latin phrase goes. How does Europe's defence capability measure up in the context of Ukrainian experiences?
At least 110,000 shells per month
The war in Ukraine is often called a drone war, but—in terms of losses and the nature of the actions—it has become, much like World War I, an artillery war, responsible for most of the casualties and equipment losses.
Both sides fire massive numbers of shells every day. Ukraine fires between 3,000 and 8,000 shells daily. Russia, which produces about 4 million artillery shells annually, produces at least twice as many. According to Ukrainian sources, during the peak period of its artillery activity, Russia fired up to 40,000 shells daily.
In recent weeks, the intensity of Russian fire has decreased by half despite ammunition supplies from North Korea and Iran. According to earlier reports this year by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, this is the result of effective Ukrainian strikes on the Russian logistical chain, which significantly reduced the amount of ammunition reaching the front.
Meanwhile, Ukraine's demand—assuming the minimum lower bound of usage—reaches approximately 110,000 artillery shells per month (Ukrainian decision-makers, when presenting the needs of the Ukrainian army, speak of as many as 330,000 to 660,000 shells per month). Who can produce that much?
Production smaller than demand
Currently, European and NATO capabilities can be estimated based on industry statistics. Before 2022, the United States produced about 14,000 artillery shells of 155 mm calibre monthly.
The biggest producer of artillery ammunition, Rheinmetall, produced about 70,000 shells annually. As a result, to provide Ukraine with practical assistance, it was necessary to organize an international "ammunition coalition" forced—given the scarcity of its stockpiles—to purchase shells worldwide.
The West is producing more and more ammunition
At the same time, the West is not ignoring Ukrainian experiences. Rheinmetall alone (the company serves as an example due to available data on production scale) will produce 770,000 shells this year, increasing production tenfold. By 2027, the German company's production lines aim to produce 1.2 million shells annually, with further increases planned—up to 1.5 million shells.
The industrial machine in the USA has also been set in motion, which plans to produce 100,000 shells per month by 2025.
The scale of production is worth comparing to demand. Assuming the cautious adoption of 500 Krab and K9 self-propelled howitzers (the framework agreement from 2022 foresees the purchase of 692 K9 howitzers alone!), firing 30-40 shells daily, a day of combat would mean the consumption of even 22,000 shells. This would mean using Poland's annual pre-war production within two days.
Similar analyses—for the Bundeswehr—were presented in 2022 by Frank Haun, head of the German company KMW, and in 2025 by the IFRI Institute for the French Air Force. It's important to note that such calculations carry a very high margin of error and are meant to illustrate the scale of shortages or needs rather than predict how many hours before Europe would have to capitulate.
Since the problem of insufficient stockpiles has already been recognized in the West, production capacities are being expanded—though not created overnight—and production scales are gradually increasing. Although tanks and howitzers fight on the front lines, the war is primarily a clash of economies. This is good news for the West—as long as it does not neglect further strengthening its defensive potential.
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