Kremlin escalates strikes on Ukraine: Civilian facilities targeted

In retaliation for entering the Kursk region, the Kremlin has launched missile attacks on a scale comparable to those at the beginning of the war. The main targets are the power grid and civilian facilities. The pace of strikes depends on when Russia will reach its full potential for a quick recovery. Defense Minister Andrey Belousov is responsible for this.

Nearly two weeks before the Russian attack, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence reported that a massive missile strike was expected around Ukraine's Independence Day. It provided estimated Russian stock levels, production scale, and the expected frequency of attacks.

Data published on August 16 was more accurate than summer weather forecasts—the Kremlin struck 15 Ukrainian regions overnight from Sunday to Monday, the day after the national holiday. They used 127 rockets (102 intercepted) and 109 drones (99 intercepted) in the attack. The previous comparable attack took place on April 11, with 82 missiles and drones fired at Ukraine.

The decreasing frequency of massive attacks is not surprising due to the inefficiency of the arms industry and the enormous costs. Monday's shelling alone is estimated to have cost Russia $1.26 billion. These estimates were provided by "Ukrainian Pravda." Even if they are exaggerated, the Kremlin still had to "burn through" hundreds of millions without a clear effect.

A year ago, the Russians could expect to attack with 50-60 missiles every two to three weeks, limiting the scale of strikes between rounds. This was related to the missile production cycle, mainly manoeuvring missiles of the Ch-101 family. These and Iranian drones are the main means of aerial assault.

2021 Russian factories produced 56 Ch-101 missiles, up from 460 last year. After switching to a wartime economy, the Russian industry can deliver 500 missiles annually. The question is whether this is already the peak of Russian capabilities.

In the last attack, Putin's forces used 77 Ch-101s, nearly two months' worth of production. The scale of the effort for the Kremlin is shown by data from the past three weeks. The day after the massive attack, on August 27, only five Ch-101s were fired.

The same situation applies to ballistic missiles for the Iskander system. Production of the 9M723 missiles with a range of over 500 kilometres increased from around 50 units annually before the war to 180 units last year and 150 currently. More complex 9M729 missiles with a range of over 1,500 kilometres, Russia can produce about a hundred annually.

Iskanders are used more often but on a smaller scale. Six were used in the last massive attack, and two the following day. The Russians generally fire up to 10 missiles per week from this system.

The Russian industry also has problems supplying more complex hypersonic Kinzhal missiles. Only six were fired in the last two attacks after a two-week break. Thus, the Russians exhausted two months of production of 47M2 missiles. Therefore, the main long-range strike force is Iranian Shaheds.

Last year, the Kremlin began licensed production of Shahed-136 drones, known in Russia as Geran-2. Thanks to a simple design, basic engines, and the possibility of using components from civilian drones, the Russians can produce about 500 Geran-2s monthly. Therefore, they are used only in Ukraine daily, although the scale usually does not exceed a dozen launched aircraft. This is exactly how many are in one battery. However, in the last two attacks over Ukraine, 190 Geran-2s were fired, 152 of which were intercepted by Ukrainian air defence, and two fell on the territory of Belarus.

The attacks using them often appear chaotic. The drones destroyed, for example, a 19th-century manor house housing the museum of Ataman Nestor Makhno and a hotel in Kryvyi Rih, which are militarily worthless targets. Similar attacks occurred on the Agricultural High School in Odrannem and garden plots in the Nikopol region.

This randomness in target selection and Geran-2 losses reaching 90% do not impress Russia. For the Kremlin, it does not matter whether they hit military or civilian targets—their main task is to sow terror. Attacks using drones are primarily meant to have a psychological effect, just like the German attacks using V-1 missiles on London and Antwerp in the final months of World War II.

The Russians have yet to solve another problem significant from their point of view—the lack of operational aircraft capable of carrying long-range cruise missiles. First, Ukrainian attacks forced the bomber fleet far from the missile drop zones, and second, spare parts were running low, and the combat readiness of the aircraft was significantly declining.

This is especially noticeable with the heavy Tu-95 bombers used to carry Ch-101 and Ch-22 Raduga missiles and the MiG-31K, a specially modified version adapted to carrying Kinzhal missiles. Before the war, about 40% of the 44 Tu-95MS and 20 Tu-95MSM were combat-ready. Currently, the percentage has fallen to 20%.

Only a few of Russia's 22 MiG-31Ks are operational. Therefore, no more than three MiG-31s have been airborne for about a month.

It will be tough for the Russians to improve combat readiness because none of the main types of missile carriers are in production anymore. Hence, the most worn-out specimens are more often cannibalized—some are used to repair combat-capable aircraft.

All these factors contribute to the increasingly rare Russian strikes using ballistic and cruise missiles. The Kremlin will have to wait several weeks before carrying out another attack of a similar scale.

When Putin dismissed Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in May, corruption among ministry officials was mentioned as one of the reasons for his departure. Andrey Belousov, an economist and advisor to several Russian prime ministers, but most importantly, Putin's trusted man "from the economy," was appointed to replace Shoigu.

Belousov's main goal is to integrate the defence industry with other sectors of the economy. He is also tasked with sorting out the finances allocated for armaments. After three months, there is still no sudden acceleration in this regard. However, this does not mean that the situation will remain unchanged indefinitely.