Baltic tensions rise: NATO braces against hybrid warfare

Damage to submarine telecommunication and energy cables, along with gas pipeline failures, pose a serious threat to EU and NATO countries. These are also tools used in hybrid operations. Leaders from Western countries increasingly discuss the potential sabotage linked to the Russian "shadow fleet" and units associated with China.

The situation is so significant that during Tuesday's summit in Helsinki, the main topic was securing strategic underwater infrastructure and strengthening NATO's presence in the Baltic.

Despite the inclusion of Sweden and Finland into the North Atlantic Alliance, the Baltic has not become completely controlled as an internal NATO basin. Russia, with the involvement of the "shadow fleet" and Chinese ships, continuously tests the resilience of the Alliance, the EU, and the countries of the region. These waters have become a zone where these forces clash in hybrid operations. The situation in the Baltic can be seen as a litmus test indicating the level of international tension," explains Kinga Dudzińska, an analyst for Baltic and Nordic states at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, in an interview with money.pl.

Zuzanna Nowak, an expert from the IEEI and director of analysis at the think tank The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs, shares similar views. "The Baltic Sea has become one of the main targets of Russian (and potentially other, e.g., Chinese, related to Russia) hybrid attacks due to its strategic significance and increased NATO presence following the accession of Finland and Sweden," she admits.

There are as many as 30 international cables and six gas pipelines on the floor of the Baltic. This network is vulnerable to terrorist attacks and special services activities, which are classified below the threshold of war. It involves covert actions testing resilience, diversions, sabotage, and a wide array of hybrid attacks.

The damage to the Balticconnector pipeline in the fall of 2023, or the disruption of telecommunication cables and the EstLink 2 power bridge at the end of December the previous year, are just recent examples of suspicious "incidents" that have occurred in the Baltic.

The timing of these "incidents" suggests deliberate actions, as loudly pointed out by leaders from various countries. Analogies are drawn between the events concerning China and Taiwan and the situation in the Baltic. This indicates a certain strategic approach," comments Kinga Dudzińska in a conversation with money.pl.  

Let us recall that at the beginning of January 2025, the telecommunication cable connecting Taiwan to the mainland was interrupted. Authorities in Taipei accused China of cutting it, but Beijing denied it.

The pattern of actions seems similar for a reason.

For this reason, NATO will establish a Baltic Guard, with the aim of enhancing maritime security using frigates, patrol aircraft, and other types of weaponry - announced NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Tuesday.

The problem of protecting maritime infrastructure is serious. The energy and strategic security of NATO and the EU depend on it. 

As Zuzanna Nowak explains, Russia seeks weak points, testing response mechanisms, including regional solidarity. It also tries to undermine the sense of security of Baltic and Nordic states by putting pressure on key economic energy and communication infrastructure. This results in political destabilization, fueled by disinformation attacks.

It is also notable that NATO forces are forced to disperse resources across various theatres of operation, diverting attention from Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia's reliance on Baltic ports for export and military operations constitutes its own weakness, notes the IEE expert.

The problem includes both protecting gas pipelines (including the Baltic Pipe that supplies Poland) and the fibre-optic and telecommunication network. They are responsible for the flow of information between allies, which is crucial for cooperation within NATO and the EU, explains Dudzińska.

Energy bridges are also a critically important component of underwater infrastructure. Thanks to them, the Union can create an internal power market. Interconnections stabilize the system and permit the transfer of electricity between specific countries if necessary.

In the southern part of the Baltic, we have the entire "Baltic energy ring". As we reported on money.pl, switching Lithuania from the Russian power system to the European system at the beginning of Poland's EU presidency may become another target for Russian diversion. The planned disconnection of the Baltic states from the Russian BRELL energy ring in February 2025 further emphasizes the need to protect critical infrastructure, including land-based systems, stresses Nowak.

This is a key step in making the Baltic states independent from Russian electricity supplies, which will also bolster NATO's eastern flank security. The energy bridge connecting continental Europe with the "energy island" of the Baltic countries passes through the Suwalki Gap. This is where the LitPol Link line runs, and a significant Harmony Link connection is also planned there. Additionally, the SwePol cable connects Ustka with Karlshamn in Sweden, and NordBalt connects the Swedish town of Nybro with Klaipeda in Lithuania. Furthermore, two EstLink lines connect Estonia with Finland. These cables form a crucial energy ring, securing the countries that make up the eastern and northern flank of NATO today.

The increasing frequency and sophistication of such attacks underline the urgent need for coordinated regional and NATO strategies to protect critical infrastructure and prevent future incidents. Especially since Poland's role in supporting Ukraine and strengthening the energy security of Central and Eastern Europe makes it a potential target for Russian retaliation," notes Zuzanna Nowak.

Just before Tuesday's summit, European Commission Vice-President Henna Virkkunen announced in Helsinki that the EU is prepared to increase investments in cable infrastructure and collaborate with NATO to protect it. The idea is to expand the network so severed connections can be effectively bypassed by others.

In addition to monitoring and securing networks, NATO and the EU have set a goal to eliminate the "shadow fleet" from the Baltic. Ships used to transport sanctioned Russian oil pose a real threat, primarily due to their poor technical condition.

The Baltic Sea, meanwhile, is a protected maritime area. Ships entering this area must meet strict regulations, including emission standards and very specific technical conditions. Another concern is that Russia, along with China, uses these ships for espionage tasks.

The issue is that by disrupting satellite navigation systems, disabling automatic identification systems (AIS), and transmitting falsified data, these Russian ships attempt to vanish among the multitude of vessels passing through the Baltic. However, this increases the risk of collisions and maritime disasters.

The Baltic is one of the most crowded waterways, with an average of 2,000 vessels passing through it daily. It is also a relatively shallow sea, enhancing its sensitivity to threats, emphasizes the PISM analyst.

Denmark and Sweden, which oversee the straits through which ships exit the Baltic, will be crucial in identifying these ships. Accidental incidents accompanying diversionary activities may also pose an additional problem.

Damaging underwater infrastructure by dragging an anchor across the sea floor (as reportedly happened with the EstLink cable—ed.) is associated with yet another serious threat. The Baltic is a sea where mines from World War II and sunken pollutants still lie on the seabed, reminds Kinga Dudzińska. Their disturbance could lead to a disaster.