Ukraine's industrial resurgence: Soaring ammunition and drone output

President Zelensky stated in the fall of 2024 that Ukraine had rapidly established its ammunition production capacity from the ground up in under three years. According to a report by the Centre for Eastern Studies, the country's defense industry, which the war had nearly wiped out, was quickly revived while expanding with new capabilities.

Thanks to these efforts, Ukraine—though still dependent on foreign aid—can produce more ammunition and critically important weapons systems, such as drones, from quarter to quarter.

As a result, in 2024, Ukraine produced 2.5 million artillery shells of various calibres—from 50-mm mortar rounds (of which 100,000 were found defective) to 155-mm and 155.5-mm howitzer shells. According to Ukrainian sources, this represents more than a sixfold increase compared to 2022 and a fourteenfold increase compared to the years before the full-scale Russian attack.

With support from foreign partners, including Germany, Ukrainian ammunition production is expected to continue growing. Ammunition production is also increasing in Europe, where Rheinmetall alone, which produced 30,000 shells of 155.5-mm calibre in 2022, ended 2024 with a result of 700,000 (about half of all production on the Old Continent) and ultimately plans to produce up to 1.1 million shells annually.

Despite significant increases, production still does not meet demand. The scale of the "ammunition hunger" is starkly illustrated by the situation in Russia, which—after producing about 4-4.5 million artillery shells in 2024—is forced to import ammunition from Iran or North Korea.

It is worth comparing these figures with the scale of Polish production. When politicians talk about a level of 30-50,000 shells of 155.5-mm calibre annually, experts like Piotr Małecki from Defence 24 believe the realistic capacity is around 6,000 shells per year.

Despite the passage of time, the state-run Polish Armaments Group's announced increase in production capacity remains unfulfilled. However, a private company—Grupa Niewiadów —may soon fill the gap. Grupa Niewiadów has produced mortar ammunition and is planning to start producing 155.5-mm howitzer shells within two years.

Alongside the mass consumption of artillery shells, the war in Ukraine also consumes countless swarms of drones. The exact number is difficult to estimate, but the production of small and large unmanned aerial vehicles—which before the war in Ukraine was almost nonexistent—has already reached millions.

According to official data cited by Ukraine's Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Havrylyuk, the Ukrainian army currently receives 200,000 drones monthly from domestic factories and workshops—excluding foreign aid—and production in 2024 increased tenfold. This growth is not over, as Ukraine's Foreign Ministry chief Andriy Sybiha revealed plans for 2025 to produce up to 4 million drones.

This should not be surprising, given the data provided by Major General Mykhailo Drapaty, Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He believes that 80-90% of the defence capabilities of Ukrainian forces on the front line depend on drones.

This is partly a result of the specific nature of the Ukrainian conflict, where both sides experience a shortage of advanced weapon systems, such as anti-tank guided missiles or precision artillery ammunition.

In such conditions, the substitute for anti-tank missiles has become FPV drones controlled by a pilot wearing goggles, through which they see a real-time image from a camera placed on the drone.

Other drones, such as those dropping various explosive charges known as Baba Yaga or "dragon drones," which drop burning thermite on enemy positions, partially substitute guided artillery shells.

Unmanned maritime vehicles have also made a significant mark in the history of the Ukrainian conflict. Despite the Ukrainian navy being destroyed at the start of the conflict, they have managed to carry out several spectacular attacks on Russian ships and even, in what was a world first, shoot down at least one Russian helicopter.

The scale of drone use is highlighted by a Ukrainian plan unveiled in February 2025 to build a "drone line". Special military units, like the drone regiments "Raróg" or "Feniks," will be assigned to specific front-line sectors. They will create a 10-15 km death zone along the lines of combat, where no enemy vehicle will survive due to drone attacks.

The vision of a "drone line" is impressive and captivating, but it's worth remembering that effectively using this type of weapon encounters many obstacles in Ukraine. There is a constant race between drone manufacturers and creators of radio-electronic warfare systems, various jammers, and other devices aimed at disrupting drone operations. An attempt to circumvent this problem is abandoning wireless communication in favour of fibre optics, but even this solution has flaws.

Regardless, the scale of drone usage proves the significant role this type of weapon plays in the conflict in Ukraine and will most likely play in other future conflicts. The course of the war demonstrates simultaneously how crucial the expansion of Ukraine's capabilities in ammunition and military unmanned vehicle production is for its survival.