Ukraine faces a pivotal year amid escalating challenges

Ukraine concludes the year 2024 with significant territorial losses, logistical problems, and ongoing personnel shortages at front-line units. The last three months were particularly challenging for the Ukrainian army, reminiscent of the difficulties faced in the spring of 2022. Quick remedial actions have done little to help: In November, Major General Mykhailo Drapaty became the new Commander of the Land Forces, and the previous month, a plan was announced to mobilize an additional 160,000 soldiers to address the most urgent needs.

Without further radical measures, the situation could worsen. The question is whether the government and citizens are prepared for further sacrifices. As the war drags on, with increasing losses and ongoing setbacks, support for continuing the fight is declining. The year 2025 could be crucial for the conflict's future in the country's southeastern part. It may end with Russians taking over the entire Donbas.

Ukrainians have suffered from a chronic shortage of human resources, which has been an enduring issue since the end of the first year of the war. So far, Kyiv has mobilized only 4.5% of its citizens and cannot significantly increase this percentage. Various factors contribute to this situation.

The most significant is a demographic crisis worsening over the years, further exacerbated by the outbreak of war. The population in areas controlled by Kyiv has declined from 38 million to approximately 25-27 million. Formally, Ukraine can mobilize around 5 million people. However, to safeguard the country's future, men from the age of 25 are being mobilized. Additionally, numerous exemptions further reduce the pool. Realistically, Kyiv can count on a maximum of 2-2.5 million people, of which 1,050,000 have already been called.

Increasing the draft within Ukraine and bringing back conscription-age men who left the country after the war broke out could be beneficial to improve the situation. Among the nearly 700,000 men who went to Western Europe, about 200,000 met the requirements of the new mobilization law. However, there is reluctance from politicians to make further calls and from citizens who believe the army is misusing soldiers' lives.

After a year-long delay in mobilization, Ukrainians have formed at least ten new brigades. There is talk of six mechanized brigades, three infantry brigades within the Territorial Defense, and one Jaeger unit. President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned 14 brigades in August. Consequently, in October, the decision was made to call up 160,000 people. This move aims to bring unit staffing up to 85%.

This is a necessary step if Kyiv is to halt Russian aggression. However, even if mobilizing people was achievable, another problem arose. All brigades lack equipment.

Deciding to mobilize is one thing; executing it is another. Ukrainians are holding off on mobilizing because they lack equipment for the new units. Only four of the newly formed brigades have been provided with armoured vehicles, engineering equipment, and artillery. The rest have received only trucks, off-road vehicles, and infantry weapons and equipment.

Ukrainians cannot afford to send inadequately equipped and trained soldiers. Personnel losses affect them much more significantly than the Russians, with numbers still rising due to exhaustion and lack of rotation. This causes a substantial wave of desertion. The newspaper "Financial Times" reported that in the first ten weeks of this year, more Ukrainian soldiers deserted than in the first two years of the war. The Ukrainian prosecutor's office has launched 60,000 cases against soldiers suspected of desertion. The situation has likely not improved since these data were published.

The Ukrainian army has fallen into a vicious circle, and escape is possible only with the help of Western allies. President Zelensky plays a major role in this. However, he has lost much of his charisma, which previously allowed him to cover up political mistakes. When the government in Kyiv was still engaging in PR activities rather than pure propaganda, it was easier for citizens to accept unpopular decisions, especially regarding restrictions on movement and transitioning the state to wartime modes. Currently, such measures are no longer accepted passively but are met with protests.

Zelensky has alienated himself from many people with his lack of understanding of the military, repeated dismissals of line officers and staff officers, and by surrounding himself with people who do not strongly challenge the mistakes being made. In Kyiv, it is said that around the Mariinsky Palace, the president's residence, there is not only a brick wall but a political one that prevents bad information from getting through. The president also does not acknowledge mistakes in his actions. This has not gone unnoticed by allies.

For some time now, Zelensky has been perceived as a supplicant rather than a discussion partner. Without changing the approach to negotiations and policies regarding image, support for aiding Ukraine will decline, and without adequate backing from politicians and the public, more tanks, armoured vehicles, and ammunition will not reach the East.

This is especially true for the new administration that will take office in the White House in January. It seems to lack a deep understanding of international politics and will be guided primarily by economic considerations. This is evident from recent announcements by Donald Trump, who has linked further assistance to financial and economic matters.

None of the changes in command positions made by Zelensky have yielded the expected results on the front lines. The only visible change was the abandonment of the stubborn defence of cities, from which Ukrainians prefer to withdraw rather than suffer massive losses. The situation is exacerbated because, in selected front sections where Russians are operating, Ukrainians cannot establish a stable defence based on strong field fortifications. This results from a lack of personnel, stretched lines, and earlier disregard for preparing a deep defence: companies hold sections that battalions should occupy in many places.

This also complicates the command process. Very often, units or even subunits are detached from brigades and moved to threatened sections of the front, creating logistical problems. This is most evident along the Operational Command-Brigade command line.

It became apparent that abandoning the intermediate command level, which is the division, causes problems during rapidly changing front-line situations and limits combat capabilities. Independent brigades commanded directly by Operational Commands proved excellent during the first 18 months of the war when Ukrainians employed manoeuvre defence.

Ukrainian brigades are larger than those in other armies. Each is an independent brigade combat team with its own logistical, technical, and medical support. This extensive support allows for operations based on their forces at least several days after deployment to the operating area, providing great flexibility in action.

However, in static defence, facing growing shortages of resources and personnel, coordinating the actions of many units and tactical connections is often challenging, which in turn overburdens the Operational Commands. The solution was supposed to create battle groups that would act at an intermediate level. Without expanded staff, they remain inefficient. Improving the command process will be one of the most important tasks facing General Drapaty, and Ukraine should implement reforms as soon as possible.

Without radical changes, the pace of Russian advancement will increase, which is already quite substantial. Over the past three months, the average daily advance pace has not fallen below 16 square kilometres. Since 2014, the Russians have managed to occupy about 99% of the Luhansk region, 66% of the Donetsk region, and 73% each of the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions. Although the situation for Ukrainians is becoming more difficult daily, the Kremlin is still far from fulfilling its strategic plans.

At the current pace, capturing the Donetsk region will take them about two more years. However, it's not just slowing the Russian advance and bleeding the Russians but stopping their progress. If this were a democratic country, the current actions might be justified. Still, the Russian Federation is an authoritarian country, and the deaths of thousands of soldiers will not affect the situation at the Kremlin. Ukrainians must physically stop the Russians and begin to push them back. This remains wishful thinking at the current stage and with the prevailing problems.