Russia's missile shortage hinders ambitions in Ukraine conflict
Additional drafts, and recently even support from North Korea—Russia continues to supply new waves of "cannon fodder" to the war. However, the Kremlin's appetite for capturing the entire Donbas is hindered by a chronic shortage of cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as aircraft to carry them. In the fall of 2024, this is one of the few pieces of good news from the Ukrainian front.
17 November 2024 17:01
During last year's attacks on Ukrainian strategic infrastructure, Russians were able to strike with 50-60 missiles every two to three weeks. This was related to the production cycle of missile rockets, mainly cruise missiles from the Kh-101 family, which, alongside Iranian drones, are their main means of aerial assault.
Currently, it took them as long as 73 days to conduct another significant attack using cruise missiles. In the case of the ultra-modern, highly praised ballistic missile Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, as touted by Russian propaganda, this period is even longer, at 145 days. Moreover, during the last attack, the Russians were able to use only three Kinzhals, two of which were shot down. This situation is related to the fact that the Kremlin has significant production challenges with these expensive and particularly complex missiles.
Components used to be available, but not anymore
Before the war, the price of one Kinzhal was about 10 million dollars (14 million Canadian dollars). Most components came from the West. Sanctions have forced the Russians to look for new sources to sustain production.
Towards the end of 2023, it was revealed that the Moscow-based company ETC Electronics LLC, created two years earlier, imports American microchips produced by Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, and Altera through the Chinese company ETC Electronics Limited. The Russians inadvertently admitted to this by awarding ETC Electronics LLC a state prize. The source has been cut off, and since then, production of the Kh-47M2 has significantly decreased. Western intelligence estimates that as a result, only up to three Kinzhals are being produced monthly.
The lack of components also affects the production of the Kh-101, the most commonly used missiles against Ukraine. In theory, Russia can produce 40-50 of them monthly. This seems to be the peak capacity. However, the lack of complex home-produced integrated circuits actually reduces production capacities by one-third.
The aggressor faces another problem: the increasingly felt lack of carriers for the missiles. Hence the integration of more Kh-101 types with Su-34 aircraft, which are the most numerous type of Russian tactical bombers.
Strategic bombers - a relic, but still dangerous
After the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine and the Russian Federation divided the strategic aviation capabilities. Ultimately, Ukrainians scrapped some of their bombers and transferred eight Tu-95 and one Tu-160 to Russia in return for debt relief for gas supplies.
The Tu-95 bombers are a vintage design that originated from the late 1940s. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin witnessed the flight of the machine, and the Tu-95 entered service three years after his death. The aircraft were produced even after the USSR collapsed—the serial production ended after 41 years in 1994. The 59 aircraft used by the Russian army mainly date back to the 1980s.
Despite undergoing multiple design changes, the Tupolevs still lack modern electronic equipment, self-defence systems, or ejection seats. Therefore, the seven-member crew has slim chances of survival after an aircraft hit. This explains why Russians try not to approach the Ukrainian border.
Today, the Kremlin has two divisions of strategic aviation, comprising six heavy bomber regiments. The 326th Heavy Bomber Division is stationed in the Far East and includes Tu-95 and Tu-22 aircraft. In contrast, the western part of the Federation houses the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Division.
The main burden of attacks on Ukraine has been shouldered by the 121st Guards Heavy Bomber Regiment, equipped with seven Tu-160M bombers and nine Tu-160s, and the 184th Heavy Bomber Regiment, which possesses 18 Tu-95MS. The third unit, the 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Regiment, is permanently stationed at the Shaykovka airfield near Kirov. The regiment is equipped with 23 Tu-22M3 aircraft.
Russians very rarely use the Tu-160 in operations, as they have very few. Losing even one of these aircraft would be a significant setback, not only militarily but also in terms of image. Russian propaganda, somewhat overzealously, emphasizes that it is the world's most modern bomber.
"Cannibalization" that pleases
In the first week of November, Ukrainian reconnaissance noticed that Russian strategic bombers resumed intensive training after three weeks when only single units took to the air. In total, 15 Tu-95MS, 6 Tu-22M3, and a few Tu-160 participated in training flights. Even official Russian channels boasted that the bombers conducted training flights in international airspace over the Black Sea and the Barents Sea.
The longer operational break was likely forced by the need to perform inspections and periodic overhauls on the intensively used aircraft. The combat readiness of the Tupolevs has never been high, anyway.
Out of 44 Tu-95MS and 20 Tu-95MSM just before the war, about 30 percent were combat-ready. Currently, this percentage must be even lower. This is not only due to the low technical culture of the Russians but also to the short life spans and conducting renovations not based on flight hours, which have significantly increased during the war, but on the calendar. Additionally, to repair the machines without the threat of attack, they had to be moved to the Tupolev plants in Samara or Kazan.
The situation is further worsened by the fact that Russian strategic bombers are no longer produced, and the spare parts stock is small. The "cannibalization" of the oldest aircraft has slowly begun, turning them into suppliers of parts. The Russians have no choice—they need something to deliver the missiles to the drop zone.
