Russian mobilization reserves stretched thin amid rising losses

Soviet-era tactics, "meat assaults," and equipment mostly from the late 20th century highlight the weaknesses of Russian armoured forces, evident even to the naked eye. So, where are the advances of Putin's army coming from? And how long can Russia continue to tap into its mobilization reserves when it loses an average of 30-40% of its forces in every skirmish?

From the war's outset, Russian armoured-mechanized units have generally struggled during manoeuvre warfare. Commanders made rookie mistakes, logistics failed to provide support, and soldiers left to their own devices, panicked. This was particularly evident in the battles near Brovary, Kharkiv, and during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Hostomel.

The situation has only worsened, with the fierce fighting at Vuhledar showcasing the Russian army's pride in a state of decay. Where do the high losses of the Russian armoured-mechanized forces come from? The problem is complex, and its roots trace back to Soviet times.

The lost war in Georgia revealed that the rigid military structure originating from the USSR era was outdated and did not suit modern warfare conditions. A few months after the end of operations in 2008, the Kremlin initiated a reform aimed at increasing unit mobility, simplifying command, and reducing personnel without losing combat capability.

By 2013, the peacetime organization of armoured forces, which originated from Soviet times, was changed. Previously, the army had the highest rank, followed by the division, regiment, and battalion. After the reforms, divisions were removed from the organization’s logistic support elements, and brigades were tasked with handling logistics. This meant increasing mobility by assigning logistical units directly to tactical battalion combat groups, aligning with NATO practices.

The organizational change was noticeable during the first months of the war in Ukraine, but in the Russian version, it completely failed. Observing the logistic operations, the chaos among the Russians was apparent. Mechanized columns stuck to main, wide roads because the accompanying logistical convoy couldn’t allow for any other action.

Whenever the columns veered onto narrow or unpaved roads, they got stuck in the mud or tight alleyways and were quickly neutralized. Consequently, as seen in recordings published online, columns with fuel tankers passing through apartment blocks had to wait patiently. This was because they couldn’t leave the fuel tankers or ammunition vehicles unprotected and hope the unguarded tankers would reach their destination at all.

The reform would have made sense without the chaos and Russian sloppiness. The Americans demonstrated how it was done in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm and in 2003 during the capture of Baghdad. Airborne units seized bridges, and swift mechanized thrusts with strong direct air support broke the Iraqi defence lines and moved into the city centre.

The American attack was orderly: paratroopers first secured key positions, reconnaissance teams searched for the best routes, and battle groups moved in with infantry cover. Behind them, in the third line, was the artillery, and at the very end, logisticians organized forward staging points where they amassed handy supplies. Unlike the Russians, the Americans did not pause even for a moment due to any shortages.

Americans have developed the tactics from the Arabian Peninsula since World War II, giving them plenty of time to refine the details and instill the doctrine even in rank-and-file soldiers. The Russians not only had significantly less time, but they also didn’t reform their training system.

Another structural error the Russians made was failing to adapt the training system for conscripts and contract soldiers to the needs of real military operations. Soldiers were trained to perform tasks on training grounds under comfortable conditions. Nobody interfered with the deployment; artillery fired from prepared positions with drone support, and aircraft roamed freely over the battlefield. This training process looked excellent in demonstrations for officials but completely failed during actual combat.

Company and battalion commanders struggled with field command from the beginning of the war in Ukraine. They made basic tactical errors: they moved in tight columns, lacked anti-aircraft cover, and neglected reconnaissance. Group leaders couldn’t coordinate with artillery and air force support if not enough. It quickly became apparent that ground forces were practically left without close air support.

A prime example of such an operation was the battle near Brovary, where the commander directly led a regiment in the first tank. When his tank was destroyed, the column halted in the middle of the city, and Ukrainian artillery destroyed it completely. Logistics failed, morale collapsed, desertions began, and abandoned equipment littered the fields. The Russian armoured regiment would have entered Kyiv from the east if not for this.

Over time, the situation worsened for the Russians. Soldiers who gained some experience were either eliminated from further combat or had to go on rest. Currently, the army is commanded by people without education and experience, burdened with political expectations, which prevents acting in accordance with military practice.

This was recently visible at Vuhledar and Kurakhove, where the Russians reverted to tactics the Soviets developed a hundred years ago. It involves artillery preparation followed by a rolling barrage preceding the tank and infantry assault. However, this strategy only works due to the Russians' numerical superiority, which allows them to afford heavy losses. At Kurakhove, they lost about 60% of the forces used in the assault due to leaders’ lack of tactical awareness.

The biggest problem for the Russians on the battlefield is the lack of tactical reconnaissance. Their drones, such as the Orlan-10, have little technical advancement. Moreover, Ukrainians destroy them so efficiently that domestic arms factories can’t keep up with the replenishment. Hence, the purchases in Iran, probing other markets, and using stop-gap solutions.

Fighting units often don’t even know what’s two kilometres away. They have no idea if the vehicles in front of them are their own or Ukrainian, where to hit to find a gap in the defence, or how to direct artillery fire effectively.

The problem for the Russians is also that both sides still use equipment from Soviet times. Without identification friend or foe (IFF) systems in ground troops and the lack of lightweight reconnaissance means, including drones, Russians have been forced to paint large identifying letters on vehicle hulls so that, in the heat of battle, they do not confuse their own vehicles with those of the enemy.

The Russian army is poorly trained and, even worse, led. Line commanders are lost, while staff officers in Moscow are pressing them to complete assigned tasks. For several years, officers have been promoted primarily based on loyalty to the regime rather than merit, hence the repeated "meat assaults."

Those tasked with these assaults, in turn, are soldiers who have been in reserve for years and underwent only superficial refresher training before being sent to the front. Moreover, they are given equipment mostly pulled from forgotten warehouses, so their fire control, communication systems, and weaponry are, at best, at the level of the late 20th century.

This means that Russian losses will continue to rise, and the minimal successes they achieve on the front will come at the cost of more graves. In this way, the Russians will only be able to conduct operations as long as they can tap into their mobilization reserves, and those are not bottomless.

Sławek Zagórski for Wirtualna Polska