Russian military faces crippling losses and logistical failures in Ukraine

In Zaporizhzhia, the Russians have stopped using tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Ukrainian intelligence reports that they have relocated these to Donbas, where they are still attempting to break through the front lines.

According to data available to Ukraine, in June alone, the Russians lost around 420 tanks. This is a record number, as the average from the previous three months - already high - stood at 390 vehicles. These losses were a result of unsuccessful and repeatedly suicidal attacks.

Even worse from the Russian perspective is the situation of the mechanized troops. Units equipped with tracked and wheeled infantry fighting vehicles lose almost 890 vehicles monthly, an increase of 60 percent compared to last year.

The problem has grown to such an extent that the Russians have had to concentrate tanks only on key directions. Locations not prioritized were almost completely stripped of armoured vehicles. Their difficult situation is well depicted in videos of attacks carried out by biker squads or Chinese light off-road vehicles, which are aptly compared to golf carts.

Spokesperson for the 14th Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard "Red Kalina" Capt. Mykola Koval said on the brigade's online channel that the Russians have been using a new tactic on the Tokmak section of the front for some time.

"The enemy is trying, as much as possible, to use less equipment or not to use it at all, sending several soldiers into the attack," said Koval, adding that this tactic has been observed for several weeks. "They have suffered heavy losses here and probably cannot find new people or equipment yet."

Ukrainian intelligence confirmed in a statement that the situation changed after the Russians suffered heavy losses near Avdiivka, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar. By transferring equipment to critical sectors, the Russians have fallen into a spiral from which it will be hard to escape.

The aggressor's losses are likely to continue to grow. This is a consequence of the situation in which the Russians find themselves. When the war began, the Kremlin had a relatively large number of experienced crews. Over nearly 30 months of fierce fighting, the best-trained ones have been depleted, and now reservists with a short "refresher course" are being sent to the front.

Consequently, the current level of tank crew training is shallow. Additionally, untested crews are using equipment that is incomparably worse than what the Russian army initially had.

Firstly, the Russians lack the Western electronic technologies they were importing. Secondly, most vehicles sent to the front are machines pulled out of storage, unpreserved, and refurbished. During the second year of the war, unpreserved vehicles were in decent technical condition, but now, the worse ones are being pulled out. For example, about 935 T-80B and T-80BV tanks have been sent to the front so far, and only about 300 of these machines may remain in storage.

A report by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the Russians lost about 9,000 tanks and armoured vehicles in the first two years of the invasion. Therefore, they were forced to resort to archaic T-62, T-54, and T-55 tanks. Even technically, museum-level BTR-50 armoured personnel carriers, which entered the Soviet Army in 1954, have begun to appear on the front lines.

According to Russian reports, the UralVagonZavod tank factory, which produces new T-90M tanks and modernizes T-72B3 and T-80BV tanks, can deliver 50 tanks to the front per month. In reality, it is much worse. The French Institut Action Resilience estimated that tank production in Russia does not exceed 390 units annually. That is about 30 vehicles per month. This means that losses are ten times greater than the production capacity of Russian factories.

The production of infantry fighting vehicles is equally dire. Currently, BMP-3 production reaches about 440 units annually. The Russians can reclaim and refurbish about 600 BMP-1 and BMP-2 vehicles per year from storage. However, the storages are not bottomless. According to analyses, they are already 70 percent empty.

Finally, it came to fruition with the imposition of sanctions: the Russians could not send to the front a sufficient amount of equipment that would technically match what was provided to Ukraine by its allies.

Despite being switched to wartime production, the Russian defence industry cannot match battle losses. However, the Russians still have large equipment stockpiles and a human reservoir to wage a prolonged positional war.