NGAD sticker shock: Pentagon looks to cut costs

The NGAD program was intended to provide the U.S. Air Force with a new, next-generation aircraft to replace the current F-22 Raptor. However, the ambitious goals did not hold up against reality: the estimated cost of the new aircraft now reaches hundreds of millions of dollars. The Pentagon must look for savings.

The NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance) program was supposed to identify a successor to U.S. air superiority fighters by 2030 and introduce a next-generation, sixth-generation aircraft into service.

In this way, the U.S. Air Force was to symbolically say goodbye to – because the process of withdrawing older aircraft is planned for many years – machines designed according to the assumptions from the height of the Cold War.

When the 5th-generation multi-role aircraft, the F-35, was supposed to replace the F-16 and A-10 (theoretically, because its capabilities cause a lot of controversies), the effect of the NGAD program – a 6th-generation aircraft – was supposed to oust older air superiority machines from the U.S. Air Force, primarily the F-22 Raptor.

The new, futuristic aircraft, although it became the hallmark of the NGAD program, was supposed to be just one of its results. Ambitious assumptions predicted that as a result of development work, a futuristic "system of systems" would be created – a manned combat aircraft, unmanned machines known as loyal wingmen, as well as new propulsion systems, aviation weaponry, and communication means.

The highest commanders of the U.S. Air Force have repeatedly emphasized that it is precisely such a network of interconnected, cooperating solutions, with the foundation of a completely new aircraft, that will be the appropriate tool for winning future wars.

"It is completely clear to us that to enter the mid-2030s with a force that ensures victory, we must reach for the sixth-generation fighter," said Gen. Richard Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Thus understood, NGAD was supposed to elevate American aviation to a completely new level, maintaining or even increasing its current superiority over all potential adversaries, with China or Russia at the forefront.

The latest news from across the ocean, however, indicates that the Pentagon adopted too ambitious assumptions, both in terms of results and the timetable of the entire program. If the plan were adhered to, a contract to build the prototype of the new aircraft was supposed to be signed in 2024. It looks like nothing of the sort will happen.

Current simulations indicate that the new aircraft – according to estimated prices from 2030 – may cost as much as $300-400 million (for comparison – the F-35, considered expensive, costs about $80 million). Assuming that the U.S. will need 1,000-1,500 new machines, the program's cost becomes unaffordable even for the world's largest economic power.

Speculations circulating earlier on this topic were ultimately confirmed by work on the U.S. Air Force budget for the 2026 fiscal year (dates do not coincide with the calendar).

As the Pentagon modernizes two of the three elements of the nuclear triad (the B-21 Raider bomber and the Sentinel missile), the U.S. cannot afford another modernization program estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars. The research alone in the next five years was supposed to consume over $28 billion.

In a statement for the Aviation Week service, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall confirmed that budget decisions could affect the future of the NGAD program. To save it, it is necessary to reduce the unit price of new aircraft to a level close to the F-35 – a value of $100 million was indicated as the upper limit.

The way to achieve such a significant cost reduction is to lower requirements. Although America is not giving up on the new aircraft, which is considered necessary in the event of a confrontation with China, the method of cutting costs is to move some research and development work out of the program or give up some of it.

At the same time, the idea returns to revisit the 2019 concept of the Digital Century Series instead of one large development program. This is a reference to the so-called Century Series – a series of combat aircraft, produced quickly and massively in the 1950s, which included the F-100 Super Sabre, F-101 Voodoo, F-102 Delta Dagger, F-104 Starfighter, F-105 Thunderchief, and F-106 Delta Dart.

According to its assumptions, the American industry, instead of creating futuristic, mature technical solutions over the years, and building a perfect aircraft on their foundation, should reverse the entire process. Thanks to this, a relatively small series of the best aircraft that the industry can provide at the moment would enter service every few years.

In this way, the Air Force would constantly have the best possible equipment, and research and development work would be conducted not within large and expensive programs, but evolutionarily, through a continuous process of improving what the industry and aviation currently have.