Belarus provocations on Ukraine's border: Fortified defences hold firm

Belarusian units are moving towards the border with Ukraine. They are accompanied by vehicles painted with the tactical sign "B." While the West wonders if Lukashenko is just provoking or actually preparing for war, Ukrainians have long been ready for any scenario. For the past two years, a line of fortifications has been built in Polesia to stop a potential attack.

On August 10, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko ordered the dispatch of troops towards the Ukrainian border. The official reason was a "Ukrainian provocation" caused by the drone, which, according to Minsk, entered the Mogilev region and was shot down by air defence systems.

In fact, drones often fly into Belarusian airspace. However, these are not Ukrainian aircraft, but Russian Shaheds and Gerans. In the last week, at least three drones appeared over Belarus. Minsk used this as a pretext to "ensure Belarus' security."

"There were and will be no orders to go to war outside our country. We will only go to war when they come to us with bad intentions. That's all," Lukashenko said at a meeting on current information policy issues, broadcast by state-controlled media.

Pavel Latushko, a Belarusian oppositionist, told the BBC that it was "a game by Lukashenko." According to him, Lukashenko wanted to show the Russian president that his soldiers were already busy maintaining security on the Ukrainian border and could not be transferred to the Kursk region.

Officially, the Belarusian army conducts annual manoeuvres in border regions related to the training cycle of recruits drafted during the spring conscription. Monitoring by the "Belarusian Hajun" project, whose members observe military movements in Belarus, indicates that the army grouping near the Ukrainian border consists of about 1,100 people. This corresponds to previous practice. Belarusians usually conduct exercises with battalions or regiments in August, roughly about a thousand soldiers.

This is not a large number, but about 3,500–4,000 soldiers are stationed in the Brest and Homel regions, which are closest to Kyiv. For comparison, the entire Belarusian army consists of about 60,000 people, but recently, regime representatives announced plans to increase its size to 80,000. This is not a force that Ukrainians should fear.

In February 2022, five tank battalions and 15 mechanized battalions struck Kyiv from Belarus. This amounted to 9,000 infantry soldiers, 450 infantry fighting vehicles, and about 150 tanks. This was barely one-third of the forces the Russians sent to the capital. They lost then, despite the attackers being well-trained. Now, it would be much worse.

Driving along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, the swampy pine-birch forests of Polesia stretch on both sides of the road. Despite numerous attempts, the Soviets never managed to drain them completely. Today, they serve as a natural barrier that the Russians already bounced off of in March 2022.

Between Sarny and Kyiv, there are only four asphalt roads that could be used by attacking columns from the north. Of these, only one is a four-lane road. The others can be compared to county roads or narrow national roads in Poland. The vast majority are simply gravel roads leading to small villages scattered among fields and forests. The attackers would have no choice but to use them. However, Ukrainians have fortified them very well.

Just a few kilometres from the border, defensive positions with MT-12 Rapira anti-tank guns, anti-tank grenade launchers, and machine guns are scattered. Further positions are spread out beyond that.

The M07 road connects Lublin through Kovel and Sarny to Kyiv and is also heavily defended. At this depth, every village and town checkpoint is fortified. Positions are built around bridges and overpasses. Trenches and bunkers are visible in the forests.

An assault on such fortified positions would result in heavy fighting and significant losses for the attackers. Both Minsk and Kyiv are aware of this. That is why the Ukrainians are relatively calm.

For almost two weeks after the Belarusian regrouping began, Kyiv did not react. On the contrary, spokespeople for the border guard and the Operational Command "North" stated that "no concentration of enemy forces and resources has been observed on the northern border."

It was only on August 25 that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement directly pointing to the threat posed by the presence of the Belarusian army near Ukraine's borders.

"Conducting exercises in the border area and in close proximity to the nuclear power facility, the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, poses a threat to the national security of Ukraine and global security in general," noted the ministry.

At the same time, diplomats stated that "in case of a violation of Ukraine's state border by Belarus, our state will take all necessary measures to exercise the right to self-defence guaranteed by the UN Charter."

Minsk was also warned that "all troop concentrations, military facilities, and supply routes in Belarus will become legitimate targets for the Armed Forces of Ukraine."

Everything indicates that painting tactical signs on vehicles is just a game intended to relieve the fighting Russians and force the Ukrainians to move their units north. Lukashenko is aware that participation in an attack on Ukraine does not pay off for him.

However, if Belarus decided to participate in the war, it would currently be able to field only 15 battalion tactical groups. This would not change the Russians' poor operational situation, but it could seriously complicate the internal situation in Belarus, where aspirations for democratization are quite strong. Therefore, it is more likely that Lukashenko's regime will continue to support Moscow materially and logistically while also providing its industrial base.