Ukraine's evolving arsenal shifts power in Russian conflict

From what distance can Ukraine attack Russian targets? Apart from the capabilities of Ukrainian aviation, which was quickly either destroyed or severely limited in its operations, initially, the range was about 75 miles.

Ballistic missiles from the old 9K79 Tochka system could cover this distance. A new Ukrainian weapon was also offered a similar range—the guided 300-mm rockets of the Vilkha system. However, both the few Tochkas and the Vilkha missiles were quickly depleted. Outside the early period of the war, their use—though it still occurs—is very rare.

The effective range for hitting the enemy became about 25 miles, the range at which Western artillery provided to Ukraine, such as the 155 mm Polish Krab self-propelled howitzers, German PzH 2000, or French CAESAR, could fire (a few Vulcano 155 shells can extend this range to even 50 miles).

In contrast, the Russians have had access to Smerch/Tornado-S launchers (at least 55 miles), Tochka-U (75 miles), 9K720 Iskander (over 185 miles), along with a full inventory of naval and air-launched cruise missiles, placing the Ukrainian army in a very disadvantageous position. The Russians could strike not only front-line targets and their immediate rear but also any location throughout Ukraine.

The ace up Kyiv's sleeve was the R-360 Neptune anti-ship system, developed just before the war. It offers a range of about 175 miles, and Ukrainian sources attribute the sinking of the Russian cruiser "Moskva" to Neptune (some experts disagree, suggesting the possible use of Western weapons).

The 'Moskva' was sunk about 60 miles from the Ukrainian coast, and although R-360 launchers are very few, they created a deterrent, forcing Russian ships to keep their distance from the shore.

Ukraine has also been working on adapting Neptunes to attack land targets. Although it has been reported as possible since 2023, the number of disclosed attacks using this weapon is small. The R-360 Neptune was probably used in an attack on Russian air defence systems in Crimea in September 2024.

The delivery of HIMARS launchers to Ukraine in mid-2022 marked a significant change. Thanks to unexpected strikes using GMLRS missiles with a range of about 50 miles, Ukrainians effectively hit Russian logistics, which heavily relied on railway lines.

These attacks on frontline warehouses forced the Russians to relocate their logistics support beyond the GMLRSs' range—meaning withdrawing stocks of weapons, ammunition, or fuel from the combat line.

While the Russians rebuilt their supply chains relatively quickly, the greater distances made them less efficient, and delivering everything necessary to the front became more costly.

The next breakthrough came with Ukraine receiving Western weapons with even greater range. Ballistic ATACMS missiles, as well as cruise Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, offer—under export versions subject to MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) limitations—a range of about 185 miles, keeping most significant Russian targets out of reach.

With this weaponry, Ukraine carried out a series of spectacular and effective attacks, destroying the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, the Crimean bridge, and Russian air defence systems. However, the number of missiles delivered is too small to significantly alter the course of the conflict—attacks using them allow for the destruction of critical targets and carry considerable propaganda significance but remain rare.

Moreover, for many months, these weapons could not be used by Ukraine with full freedom—until the fall of 2024, there was a ban on attacking targets within Russia's borders.

Drones have served as a substitute for cruise missiles for Ukraine; examples include various types of drones such as the AN-196 Liuty, UJ-26 Bóbr, or hybrid constructions like the Piekło or Palanycia missiles.

This weapon plays a significant propaganda role, allowing attacks deep within enemy territory, including Moscow itself. The use of such and other drones by Ukraine also forced Russia to withdraw its strategic bombers to distant airfields.

Unlike ballistic or cruise missiles, drones offer relatively small striking power. Cruise missiles, like Storm Shadow, are equipped with warheads designed to penetrate building interiors or bunkers and explode inside, where the confined space amplifies the explosion's devastating effect.

Meanwhile, most drones carry small warheads. Even those with a significant load are relatively ineffective, as drone attacks usually result in explosions occurring outside the building, damaging facades but not structural elements. If the drone does not hit a particularly sensitive target, such as an ammunition depot or fuel tank, the damage is minor and relatively easy to repair.

That is why Ukraine has long been appealing for weapons that combine long range with effectiveness, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles. These requests have so far been refused, but Kyiv is not resting on its laurels and does not limit itself to seeking assistance.

Three years of war have allowed Ukraine to refine systems like Vilkha, which now offers a range of 185 miles. Ukrainians are also working on the Sapsan ballistic missile and at the end of 2024, Sweden officially declared assistance with building long-range weapons.

In this context, the FP-5 missile, showcased by Milanion Group at the Abu Dhabi arms fair, is noteworthy. The missile is relatively simple in construction—it has a pulse jet engine, weighs six tonnes, and is reportedly capable of carrying a 2,200-pound warhead over a distance of up to 1,860 miles. Milanion Group states that it can produce 50 such missiles a month.

The presentation of this weapon is fascinating in the context of Ukraine. Milanion Group is a company from the United Arab Emirates, supplying Ukraine with, among others, land drones like Agema or self-propelled mortars such as Alacran. The display of the FP-5 missile suggests that it might be the long-range weapon Ukrainians are preparing to deploy soon.

Regardless of what becomes the new long-range Ukrainian weapon, its introduction into service could signify a significant shift in the balance of power. Even now—with very limited resources—Ukraine is able to disrupt the operations of the Russian petrochemical industry effectively.

If Kyiv indeed acquires the capability to attack distant targets with much more powerful weapons, it will gain an asset of hard-to-overstate value. Not only would it be able to strike strategic targets deep within Russia, but the mere threat of such attacks might force Russia to spread its air defence more thinly and deploy valuable launchers near significant sites across the vast country.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is awaiting further deliveries of Western aircraft, training pilots, and striving to rebuild its own air capabilities. Therefore, as Kyiv introduces new long-range weapons, effectively defending both infrastructure and forces on the front line could become a challenge beyond the capabilities of Russian air defence.