Syrian power vacuum: Rebels, rivals, and regional ambitions

The rebels are not a unified group, and it is uncertain whether the different factions of the rebellion, previously united by their opposition to Assad, can now collaborate with their common enemy. External players also continue to meddle in Syria's internal affairs.

Israeli forces have entered southern Syria and begun establishing a special security zone there. Meanwhile, the Turkish army is preparing for a major military operation aimed at completely dismantling the Kurdish semi-autonomous region in northern Syria.

The civil war in Syria is one of the most complex conflicts of the modern world. Not only because it has been ongoing for over 13 years, but also due to the large number of players involved. Bashar al-Assad held onto power thanks to a diverse Russian-Iranian coalition, further supported by Shiite militias from Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Removing Assad from the equation does not simplify the Syrian conflict. The rebels, who defeated Assad's army near Aleppo and a week later took over Damascus, are not a unified group. They are a broad coalition of different groups with varied interests and visions for post-war Syria.

The Syrian rebel camp is divided into two main factions: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, or the Levant Liberation Organization) and the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army.

HTS is led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who was previously the head of Al Qaeda's Syrian branch but distanced himself from the "central" in 2016 and created his own group, adopting more moderate political positions. HTS was the leading force in the recent rebel offensive that led to Assad's downfall. HTS fighters also took Damascus, giving Julani significant influence over the direction "new Syria" will take.

Julani has distanced himself from the image of a jihadist and is attempting to present himself as the "father of the nation." He issues manifestos directed at Syria's numerous minorities (Druze, Alawites, Christians, Kurds, etc.), ensuring them that their rights will be respected and they will have a place in the "new Syria."

These actions are having the desired effect: Western European countries are increasingly discussing the possibility of recognizing the new Syrian authority, and the USA has withdrawn the $10 million reward previously offered for information on Julani (a reward stemming from his listing as a wanted terrorist by America).

Friendly overtures towards Syrian minorities and the West are part of what Julani is doing in Damascus. He is attempting to concentrate as much power as possible into his hands. This is evident in his transitional government in the capital after Assad's fall. It consists solely of members of the so-called Government of National Salvation—a political entity controlled by Julani, created in 2017 to govern the Idlib province.

Importantly, no member of the pro-Turkish Syrian Interim Government, another entity operating in northern Syria supported by Turkey, has been included. This creates a situation where two competing governments are effectively in rebel-controlled territories.

Though Julani has allocated three governor positions to members of the pro-Turkish faction (Aleppo, Latakia, and Damascus outside the capital), the ambitions of this faction are much greater.

Julani's attempt to concentrate full control over Syria may, in the long term, lead him into conflict with the pro-Turkish faction and Turkey itself.

For now, however, Turkey's focus is diverted from the events in Damascus by the situation in northern Syria. The Turks want to use the chaos following Assad's fall to finally deal with the Syrian Kurds.

Pro-Turkish rebel forces have already taken control of the city of Manbij (previously under Russian protection before Assad's fall) and have pushed the Kurds to the other side of the Euphrates. The Turkish army is now intensely preparing for a broad offensive that aims to deliver a final blow to the Kurds.

However, Joe Biden and nearly 2,000 American soldiers, who are still present in Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria, are blocking President Erdogan's plans. The Biden administration is trying to prevent the Turkish operation and reach a compromise between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. But time is running out. On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will return to the White House, and he has always criticized U.S. involvement in Syria, even once attempting to withdraw U.S. troops from the country in 2019.

While the Turks are finalizing preparations for an offensive against the Kurds in northern Syria, in the south of the country, Israel is already conducting its own operation, codenamed "Operation Beshan Arrow." The Israeli air force is destroying heavy equipment left by Assad's army, and the Israeli military has crossed the border, occupying villages and towns adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights. The Israeli Defense Ministry announced that one of the goals of this operation is to establish a special security zone in southern Syria.

However, it's unclear what area the Israeli army will occupy or how long they intend to stay in Syria. Prime Minister Netanyahu has stated it is only a temporary occupation, but Israeli media speculate that he may want to connect this land to Israel for a more extended period.

Assad is out of the "game for Syria," but the game itself continues. Julani has certainly gained the most from Assad's fall. His people took Damascus, and he was tasked with forming a new government. His past involvement with Al Qaeda is forgotten; now, Western government delegations visit him, viewing him as a key representative of Syrian change. However, Julani does not have full control over the rebellion, as part of it is under Turkish influence. The future of the Syrian rebellion will depend on how his relations with Turkey evolve. Will all groups unite under one banner, or will the division between Julani's followers and Turkish interests persist?

For now, Julani is trying to maintain good relations with Turkey, but there are several potential points of contention. Julani wants to consolidate all power over the country in his hands. He is willing to share positions with the pro-Turkish faction, but only to the extent that it does not threaten his monopoly on power. Additionally, unlike the pro-Turkish group, Julani expresses a desire to cooperate with the Kurds.

The unresolved Kurdish issue ensures that the war in Syria will continue. Turkey's primary policy goal in Syria is not to remove Assad from power but to dismantle the Kurdish autonomous region. Turkey will likely seek to exploit the chaos in Syria and changes in the U.S. administration to achieve its ambitions.

Wealthy Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, could also influence Syrian politics. At the start of the Syrian civil war, these countries supported Syrian rebel groups but later normalized relations with Assad. Saudi Arabia and the UAE criticize Turkey's involvement in Syria, while approaching Julani with great caution. These countries may try to leverage their influence with the upcoming Trump administration to block Turkey's operation against the Kurds and lift sanctions imposed on Syria.

The current situation in Syria could also have implications for the West. The Syrian chaos might be exploited by ISIS, which, although losing its last city in Syria in 2019, was never completely eradicated and continues to operate in the Syrian Desert.

All of this ensures that the Syrian conflict will persist. Assad's fall is not the end of the war in Syria but rather the beginning of a new chapter.

Tomasz Rydelek, Middle East expert