Russia's revised nuclear doctrine: Increased flexibility in deterrence

A nuclear doctrine is a fundamental yet fairly general document that outlines the principles for using nuclear weapons. Some countries disclose the entire doctrine (according to their statement) or only part of it, treating the disclosed information as a foreign policy tool and one of the pillars of security.

This is also the case with Russia, where Vladimir Putin signed the update of the nuclear doctrine at a symbolic moment. The changes are being introduced in parallel with the decision of the United States, which, after nearly three years of war in Ukraine, agreed to attack targets within Russia using American weapons.

Some experts, like retired Lt. Col. Maciej Korowaj, comment on the Russian changes for Wirtualna Polska and talk about escalation and an increase in threat. The theory and practice regarding the use of nuclear weapons in Russia's case are seemingly contradictory.

Disclosed provisions of Russia's doctrine are defensive; Russia foresees using nuclear means in defence, and the Kremlin regards nuclear deterrence as a guarantee of the state's existence. Simultaneously, Russia's nuclear arsenal is used by its authorities as a deterrent tool to achieve Russia's set goals in international politics.

This is in accordance with the so-called Karaganov doctrine. Sergei Karaganov – a political scientist, advisor to Russian presidents, and close associate of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – has long advocated increasing the significance of nuclear weapons in Russia's military doctrine. This is intended to intimidate and deter potential adversaries of Russia. For this, the Kremlin has unique tools on a global scale.

What distinguishes the Russian nuclear arsenal is the lack of limitations on strategic weapons. While other countries treat nuclear weapons as a component of strategic deterrence, Russia also maintains tactical nuclear weapons intended for direct use on the battlefield.

The Russian nuclear triad consists of – according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative – 16 submarines with intercontinental missiles, an air component in the form of Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers (according to the latest official data – a total of 66 units), as well as land-based stationary and mobile Topol and Yars missile launchers (more than 300 launchers in total). Their complement is tactical weapons – 9K79 Tochka and 9K720 Iskander missile launchers.

In what circumstances might this arsenal be used by Russia?

The United Kingdom could serve as a point of reference. London, with the provisions of its doctrine, retains the right first to use nuclear weapons, which can be applied in the event of a threat of weapons of mass destruction attack and other attacks causing (or expected to cause) mass casualties and serious threats to the economy, environment, government, and social structure.

France also allows for the first use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, its doctrine envisions the possibility of carrying out a "de-escalatory" nuclear warning strike designed to deter a potential adversary from embarking on actions threatening France's "vital interests." France's nuclear weapons safeguard "territorial integrity, freedom to exercise its sovereignty, and public safety."

The United States specified the rules for using nuclear weapons less concretely. The US nuclear arsenal was intended – as noted by Dr. Jacek Durkalec in "Strategic Yearbook" – to deter potential opponents from attempting blackmail with weapons of mass destruction and also "to guarantee that the United States would not be intimidated by a nuclear attack and would not, out of fear for its safety, hesitate to support allies with its conventional and nuclear forces."

It is unknown how current these declarations are - in mid-2024, the Pentagon adopted a new nuclear doctrine with undisclosed content.

China adopted a different concept of nuclear deterrence. Although the 21st century has been a time of intense expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, Beijing declared it will not use nuclear weapons first. China also emphasizes that it will not threaten non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons, and the deterrent target is solely nuclear-armed states.

Russia's nuclear doctrine is based on the military doctrine adopted in 2014, supplemented in 2020 with nuclear deterrence principles. Its provisions state that Russia may use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack, but also in a situation where a conventional forces attack threatens the existence of Russia or its allies or endangers the destruction of Russian capabilities for a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The latest changes increase the flexibility in managing the nuclear arsenal – an aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies by any non-nuclear state with the support of a nuclear state can now be grounds for its use, as well as a mass air attack with non-nuclear means.

It is worth noting the vague terms used by the Russians. In one of its analyses, the Polish Institute of International Affairs emphasizes this, pointing out that Moscow's rules for the use of nuclear weapons are intentionally very general. This creates uncertainty among potential adversaries about the boundary conditions that would guarantee the use of Russia's nuclear arsenal.