North Korean artillery shifts to Russian frontlines in Kursk
North Korea dispatched approximately 10,000 infantry soldiers from its elite units to the Kursk region, equipped and trained by the Russians. Only after a month of combat and significant losses did Kim Jong Un decide to send his troops heavy equipment, including artillery and self-propelled rocket launchers.
So far, Kim's soldiers have struggled on the modern battlefield, which is dominated by drones and radars, such as the Ukrainian Biskvit-KB or SR Hawk, equipped with an optoelectronic observation system. The North Koreans proceed as if in training exercises from "Brotherhood of Arms '70," marching across open terrain in columns without support from infantry fighting vehicles or even artillery. The latter is expected to join the fray soon.
Koksans to the rescue
According to the British newspaper "Financial Times" approximately 50 Koksans, large-calibre artillery, and about 20 multi-launch rocket systems with a calibre of 240 mm on wheeled chassis, were to be sent to Russia. However, the presence of the latter has yet to be confirmed.
Although artillery in the North Korean military is somewhat modern, it is essentially stuck at a 1970s development level. Their primary artillery pieces are the M-20 howitzer, originating from the 1930s, and the D-74, a slightly newer model from the 1950s produced under licence in Korea.
Self-propelled artillery is somewhat more recent, although models M-1991 and M-1992 are essentially old howitzers mounted on tracked chassis, often using artillery tractors from the 1950s and '60s. Relatively modern are the Juche 107, featuring a chassis based on T-72 tanks. Nonetheless, the Kim regime has sent more specialized armaments to Russia.
In mid-November, a train carrying the self-propelled field gun M-1989 Koksan, with a calibre of 170 mm, was observed in Siberian Krasnoyarsk. According to unofficial sources, they have now appeared in western Russia.
The Koksan is an entirely North Korean gun design, mounted on the chassis of a Chinese Type 59 tank, which is a licensed version of the Soviet T-54 tank. The gun has a range of up to 40 km when using regular ammunition, which extends to about 60 km with ammunition featuring a gas generator. The rate of fire is unimpressive; observations from the Iran-Iraq war, during which Koksans were used, indicated a firing rate of only one shot every 2.5 minutes.
The Koksan is North Korea's equivalent to the Soviet 2S7 Pion guns, with a calibre of 203 mm, used by both Russians and Ukrainians to destroy lines of fortifications such as combat bunkers, trenches, rear supply depots, and command posts. Combined with modern reconnaissance capabilities, a well-functioning communication system, and advanced ammunition, they can be an effective combat tool.
They are meant to help, but obstacles are piling up
Following the occupation of parts of the Kursk region, the Ukrainians have constructed field fortification lines in several areas that Russian attacks struggle to break through. Consequently, the Kursk Military Group is not meeting the deadlines set by Vladimir Putin for reclaiming lost territories. The initial deadline passed at the end of September.
Ultimately, after further unsuccessful operations, Putin had to postpone the "final" date for reclaiming the Kursk region until the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump. This delay is due to concerns that the Americans will push for a ceasefire along the current front line. Losing part of the territory would be difficult for Kremlin propaganda to justify.
This is likely the main reason why two artillery regiments, each armed with 36 M-1989 Koksan guns, have appeared in western Russia. Korean equipment is anticipated to assist the Russians in recapturing lost territories. However, a significant challenge could undermine these plans.
The sole producer of 170 mm ammunition for Koksans is North Korea, and these shells must first be transported a distance of nearly 6,700 km. Given the potentially low efficiency of Russian logistics, this could be a formidable task. Considering the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces in targeting key ammunition depots, it is likely that the new equipment will have a limited impact on military operations.
The effectiveness of the Koksan may also be hindered by the training of North Korean soldiers, who may lack experience in working with reconnaissance drones and modern artillery radars. Additionally, protecting against such threats could prove difficult due to the limited mobility of their chassis.
