Kyiv adopts Mossad methods: A new front in warfare ethics

The practice of eliminating enemy commanders has a long history. During World War II, the Home Army attempted an assassination on Franz Kutschera, the SS and police commander for the Warsaw district of the General Government, and Czechoslovak commandos killed the protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Reinhard Heydrich.

Although such operations raised moral doubts—Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for example, considered assassinations of military and political leaders unethical—they became an important tool of warfare, weighing the balance of gains and losses, including German retaliatory actions against civilians.

In the context of Ukrainian actions, assassinations of senior Russian officers are seen as a retaliatory measure against those suspected of conducting or directing attacks on civilians. One controversial assassination was carried out with a hammer on Col. pilot Dmitriy Golenko, chief of staff of the 52nd heavy bomber regiment responsible for planning bombing raids on Ukrainian cities.

The controversy stems not only from the manner of the assassination but also from potential legal violations. International experts have noted that if the assassins got close enough, they could have kidnapped him, brought him to Kyiv, and put him on trial instead of resorting to murder.

Similar operations have been conducted by Israel's Mossad, targeting Hezbollah members with explosive devices hidden in pagers. This series of assassinations resulted in a significant — though not primarily intended — propaganda effect. With Ukraine's action, the image effect in the West was contrary to expectations. However, image losses were not the most crucial aspect here.

- If a commanding officer is eliminated, particularly one with real influence over military operations and a high level of competence, it constitutes a significant loss for the Russian side, notes Dr. Dariusz Materniak, a Polish expert on Eastern affairs. It's crucial to remember that these officers often have long service records and substantial combat experience, acquired not only during the war with Ukraine but also from operations that Russia has conducted elsewhere. Replacing someone in a similar position with an equally competent individual is much more challenging because such personnel are scarce, even in an army as expansive as Russia's.

- Especially since the Russian army has already suffered significant losses among senior officers at the level of colonel and above during the war with Ukraine, especially in 2022 — these losses continue to negatively impact Russian capabilities at operational and strategic levels, notes the expert.

The Russian forces face a serious shortage of command personnel. To date, over 4,300 officers of the Russian army, the National Guard, and other security forces have been confirmed dead. Of these, 467 held the rank of lieutenant colonel and above, including eight generals. In the last six months, 57 senior officers, including two generals, have died.

Dr. Michał Piekarski, a security expert from the University of Wrocław, Poland, notes another important aspect.

- The psychological factor is extremely significant, he notes. Ukraine has shown that it can reach Russian perpetrators even in the capital of the country. Consequently, the Russians will have to further strengthen the protection of their generals and facilities in Moscow and other parts of the country, diverting personnel who could otherwise perform different tasks.

Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz, a former NATO Joint Force Training Centre legal adviser specializing in the law of armed conflicts and legal aspects of military operations, shares a similar view.

- This contributes to spreading fear among the Russian "elite" and signifies a failure of Russian counterintelligence. However, a real impact on military operations would result from the elimination of, for example, the Chief of the General Staff or one of the operational front commanders, akin to the initial phase of aggression when Russian generals overlooked OPSEC and INFOSEC requirements, making it relatively easy for American intelligence to "locate" them, explains the officer.

- In this case, the Russians evidently learned from these mistakes, and such spectacular "failures" on the front are no longer observed. The situation is different in the deep rear, where the illusion of security is more prevalent because they are "at home." Paradoxically, it may be easier for Ukrainian special services to carry out such assassinations deep within Russian territory than in the front zone, he notes.

So far, in the deep rear, Ukrainians have eliminated Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov and his aide, Maj. Ilya Polikarpov, Lt. Col. pilot Dmitriy Golenko, and Lt. Cmdr. Stanislav Rzhitsky. The loss of Lt. Gen. Kirillov is notably significant. He was the commander of the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops of the Russian Federation and had already faced censure due to conducting attacks with prohibited substances.

In early May, the U.S. State Department accused the Russian Federation of violating the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, stating that the use of chemical gas was "probably driven by the desire to displace Ukrainian forces from fortified positions and achieve tactical benefits on the battlefield."

Following Kirillov's death, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation initiated a criminal case under articles of the Russian Federation Criminal Code regarding terrorism, labelling Ukrainian actions as state terrorism. However, as experts note, categorizing the issue is more complex.

- It's neither terrorism nor the elimination of criminals, explains Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz. It involves the elimination of enemy combatants using controversial methods. For them to be considered war criminals, they would have to be convicted. Ukraine doesn't have the jurisdiction to adjudicate or apply the death penalty, even in wartime, as it is a party to the Optional Protocol XIII to the European Convention on Human Rights.

Similarly, Dr. Piekarski, whose research area includes terrorism, agrees.

- This is not state terrorism, he insists. – The intended target was a soldier, and while the method was unusual, such actions are permissible during war, especially against those holding high positions in the opponent's armed forces.

Igor Kirillov was killed on December 17, 2024, in Moscow as a result of a bombing. The explosive device was hidden in an electric scooter standing in front of the building on Ryazansky Avenue, where the general lived.

"The Times" called the assassination of the general "a legitimate act of defence." In response, Dmitry Medvedev, former president and prime minister of Russia and now deputy chairman of the Security Council, stated: "Be careful! Many things happen in London...".

The Russian Federal Security Service announced on December 18 that it had detained a suspect in connection with the attack. The FSB claims the alleged perpetrator is a 29-year-old Uzbek citizen. Russian media emphasize that the man was reportedly recruited by Ukrainian special services, with a promise of USD 100,000 (CAD 140,000) and a guarantee of residence in an EU country in exchange.

So far, no evidence has been presented, and the speed of the FSB's actions has been regarded as astonishingly quick. Especially considering previous instances, where they have both underperformed in investigations following attacks and in counterintelligence protection. Ukrainian intelligence also doesn't seem to have much trouble identifying targets.

- Certainly, individuals in high command positions who play crucial roles in the command structure are high priorities for the Ukrainian side, says Dr. Materniak.

Even before the death of Lt. Col. pilot Golenko, whose body was found in October in the village of Suponyevo near Bryansk, Ukrainians published a list of names and places of residence of regimental officers accused of terrorist attacks.

- Regarding officers, target identification is relatively easy, even from open-source information. Personal data of high-ranking officers in prominent roles are often published officially, even during war. The challenge lies more in choosing the place and time of attack, which requires thorough intelligence work like identifying behaviour patterns and customary routes between home and service location, adds Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz.

- Much depends on the resources Ukrainian intelligence has in that particular location, in the vicinity of a specific officer, and possibly also on how aware the officer is of the threat and what security measures they undertake, notes Dr. Materniak.

The complexity of intelligence work makes it unlikely for attacks on major officers to be very frequent.

- Preparations for such attacks likely take weeks or even months, but in a way, the victims of these attacks have inadvertently "assisted" Ukrainian services, concludes Cmdr. Wiesław Goździewicz. - Routine kills.