U.S. Navy's Constellation-class frigates face delays, cost overruns

Between June 2020 and October 2023, several changes were made to the design, resulting in a significant increase in displacement of about 10%. This means that the future US Navy ships, some of the most critical for the efficiency of the American fleet, have already used up the displacement reserve typically accounted for future upgrades of units expected to serve for 30-40 years, even before the prototype's launch.

According to the GAO report, a remedy could be to reduce the propulsion system's power (and thus the weight), which would preserve the modernization reserve but limit the ship's maximum speed. This, in turn, would negatively impact the combat capabilities of the missile frigates and exacerbate already anticipated energy shortages or cooling system inefficiencies. This recommendation comes from the US Navy, struggling to resolve this situation. The problems themselves, according to GAO, arise from approving the shipbuilding before the design, especially some of its elements, was completed.

Other difficulties encountered during the program relate to adapting the design to American requirements. USS Constellation draws from the French-Italian FREMM type, specifically its Italian version (Bergamini type).

The ship was already adapted for the installation of American systems during the preliminary design phase in the bidding process. Still, more changes were made during development, and detailed project preparation was done to meet the expectations of the American fleet. These changes were introduced even after the project was approved, which inevitably led to – and is leading to – further delays.

The scale of the changes resulting from differences in safety standards is significant. While initially, the future USS Constellation and the Italian Bergamini were expected to be 85% similar, today, that similarity is only 15%.

In other words, when permission was granted for the prototype series (August 2022), the project was supposed to be 80% complete, and the ship was supposed to be finished in 2026. However, in April this year, it was announced that the USS Constellation would enter service three years later, and the project is 80% complete. This means that almost nothing remains of the Italian design, and the platform itself, which was supposed to significantly reduce the costs and risks associated with building new ships, has been designed almost from scratch.

The US Navy has changed 511 different sections, equipment elements, etc. The GAO report states that "currently, the two ships resemble only distant cousins."

Regarding the mentioned delays, the US Navy attributes them to a labour shortage at the Fincantieri Marinette Marine shipyard in Marinette. Still, the GAO report suggests that the continuous introduction of design changes has a more significant impact. The delays in the prototype's construction are considerable, as according to the US Navy, in September last year, the prototype was only 3.6% complete, while the program's schedule called for 35.5% completion at this stage.

It is not difficult to foresee that a series of changes has led to increased costs. The US Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, even accused the manufacturer of deliberately submitting an undervalued offer before the Senate. The value of the prototype alone has already increased by about 40% (to $1.6 billion) and given further project changes and delays, it may rise even more.

The GAO has issued recommendations in connection with the delays in this key project for the US Navy. These include reconfiguring the indicator related to project readiness (quality of documents preferred over quantity), implementing an improved assessment method when building the second frigate (future USS Congress), introducing an additional testing plan to the program, and seeking solutions for the future development of the FFG(X) program. It is currently unknown if and when this crucial program's problems will be resolved.

The FFG(X) program involves acquiring a series of 10 large missile frigates for the US Navy (or even up to 20, as the US Navy will need that many, and 10 more will be purchased under a different procedure). These will be the first true frigates built for the US Navy since the USS Ingraham (OHP type, built in 1989, decommissioned in 2014, sunk as a target ship in 2021).

In April 2020, the US Navy selected the Italian Fincantieri corporation as the winner of the competition, defeating three other teams: Austal USA (a new version of the Independence-type trimaran), General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (Alvaro de Bazan), and Huntington Ingalls Industries (a militarized Legend type). To reduce costs, an existing design was chosen, which, however, was to be adapted to the requirements of the American fleet and thus seriously modified.

The ships will have vertical launchers Mk.41, the AEGIS combat direction system, and EASR radars. The aft will be developed for a landing pad and hangar for a multipurpose MH-60R Seahawk helicopter. The hull will be over 7 meters longer and more than 1 meter more comprehensive than the original. At the same time, the silhouette change is influenced, among other things, by using a single mast instead of two (and of different construction), various weapon systems, and other equipment.

The ships will form the core of the US Navy's surface escort forces, alongside Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, future DDG(X) destroyers, and possibly new missile cruisers.

This is not the first instance where the US Navy has faced excessive cost increases, design complications, and delays. It can be said that this is almost a norm, not only in the US Navy. In the past, other cutting-edge projects, such as the Seawolf-class nuclear attack submarines, LCS-1/2 littoral combat ships, and the large Zumwalt-class destroyers, faced similar issues. Similarly, the difficulties with modernization stemming from poorly thought-out project details were not new. They affected Kidd-class destroyers and the first five Ticonderoga-class cruisers. As practice shows, even the most advanced ship design tools do not guarantee a smooth transition from concept to a successfully built unit.

On the other hand, the "Constellations" should not be written off prematurely. Despite their painful birth, they may eventually become successful ships. Furthermore, the experience gained during such a problematic project could help streamline the process for subsequent programs, e.g., Phase II of the FFG(X) program. This was also the case with the Seawolf and Zumwalt classes, where overly avant-garde, expensive, and complex units became technology incubators for future, more successful units.