Syria's power shift: Implications for Putin and Ukraine

Bashar al-Assad, who survived the Arab Spring and the civil war, inundating his country with bloodshed, suddenly lost power in just twelve days. He was compelled to flee Damascus and head to Moscow, where Putin offered asylum to him and his family.

Al-Assad's fall is also a significant setback for the Russian president. It undermines him not only in terms of his image at a critical juncture: when a change in administration in Washington could present Russia with opportunities to resolve the conflict with Ukraine. Simultaneously, the failure of Russia's ally in the Middle East does not necessarily simplify matters for Ukraine.

The declaration of Russia's global ambitions under Putin's regime was evident with their 2015 involvement in the Syrian conflict. A year after Crimea's annexation and supporting "separatists" from Donbas, Russia raised the stakes, intervening militarily beyond the borders of the former Soviet empire for the first time since the USSR's breakup.

Two years later, Putin claimed victory in the Syrian mission. The support of Russian aviation, military advisors, and mercenaries was crucial for al-Assad to maintain control over most of the country and prevent opponents from taking over.

The Russian regime could highlight Syria as evidence that, contrary to "West-hostile" propaganda, Moscow was not increasingly isolated but returning to the global stage as more than just a regional power. After 2017, Russia emerged as a key player in Syria and the region, with states such as Iran or Turkey having to consider Moscow's influence in their regional power aspirations.

The fall of al-Assad starkly challenges these global claims made by Putin. As analyst Ruslan Pukhov wrote in the Russian daily "Kommersant," the events in Syria demonstrate that Russia "Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority to intervene effectively by force outside the former Soviet Union."

Why was Putin able to save al-Assad in 2015-2017 but not now? The simplest answer is summed up in one word: Ukraine.

Seven or eight years ago, when the Kremlin effectively helped al-Assad control Syria, it wasn’t embroiled in a full-scale war against Ukraine. The situation in Syria underscores that, despite Russian propaganda, the war with Ukraine severely burdens Russia, depleting resources to the extent that Moscow cannot even defend a close ally like the former Syrian dictator.

Ukrainians not only resisted Russian conquest during the 2022 "special operation," but by mounting strong resistance, they also created circumstances that allowed the ousting of a particularly bloody dictator from Syria.

A key ally of al-Assad was Iran and the influential non-state actor in the region, Hezbollah, supported by Tehran. Hezbollah, substantially weakened by recent conflicts with Israel, also shifted the balance in Syria against al-Assad.

Even if the Russians wanted and had greater capacity to aid al-Assad, it's unclear how successful that would have been.

Al-Assad’s regime, relying in recent years solely on massive violence and repression, completely exhausted its social base, losing any genuine support due also to economic sanctions that stifled Syrian society in recent years.

Ultimately, it became evident that at the decisive moment, no one was willing to fight for the dictator. The rapid success of the opposition and the lack of significant resistance from government forces surprised observers, including those in the West.

Putin has always preferred fostering good relations with authoritarian leaders rather than with the societies from which Russia seeks support. The fall of al-Assad demonstrates that this strategy works only while an unsupported dictatorship can maintain control through violence.

Today, authoritarian leaders who have aligned with Putin are closely watching al-Assad's fall. Observing the Syrian ruler's exile, they ponder whether backing Putin was the right move, and whether he is a reliable ally who can defend his clients when needed.

The issue for Russia with Syria's change of power extends beyond Putin's image among the "international of dictators" or Moscow's unfulfilled superpower ambitions.

Kremlin's key concern now is whether Syria's new authorities will allow them to maintain their two military bases: the naval base in Tartus and the air base in Khmeimim. In 2017, al-Assad leased these to Russia for 49 years in gratitude for military aid. Whether the new leaders will honour these agreements remains uncertain. A British Chatham House analyst, Bronwen Maddox, suggested that the bases will likely remain under Russian control for now, though she noted that Russia cannot consider these assets fully secure anymore.

Both bases hold critical importance for Russia's influence in the Middle East and Africa. Tartus is Russia’s sole naval base outside the former USSR, crucial not only for its presence in the Mediterranean but also the Indo-Pacific.

After Ukraine, Africa was next in Putin's global expansion plans. Russia began establishing relationships with dictators in countries like the Central African Republic, sending Wagner Group mercenaries—known for their extreme brutality—who, in return, gained access to lucrative resources. Khmeimim airbase was pivotal for these operations. Its closure would pose significant logistical challenges to Russia’s recent presence in Africa.

Despite the situation in Syria, this isn’t necessarily favourable news for Ukraine and the region. Tatiana Stanovaya, an expert at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre, indicated that the events in Syria might stiffen Putin’s stance on Ukraine. In Putin’s view, he lost credibility in Syria, so he cannot afford anything that might appear as another show of weakness regarding Ukraine.

Even before al-Assad’s fall, Russian analysts warned that Putin might reject initial negotiation offers, believing continued war would strengthen his future bargaining position. The question is how the U.S. administration will respond to Putin's perceived vulnerability in Syria.

The shift in Syria doesn’t necessarily bring peace closer to Eastern Europe. Europe will watch Syria's developments with concerns over another possible civil war, greater chaos, new humanitarian crises, and perhaps a new refugee influx if a stable, peaceful government involving all of Syrian society in governance isn't quickly established.

Politically unstable European nations might struggle with such a situation, possibly fuelling populism—sometimes inadvertently serving Moscow's interests.