Putin's new world order: A fragile axis of convenience?

At the annual BRICS summit, named after the original member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, Putin sought to forge new alliances. In 2024, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran became full members. After the October summit, Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda joined as new partners, while nine other countries have submitted applications for membership.

The Russian leader requires this symbol on the global stage. Since 2022, the Russian Federation has been steadily losing allies who were once its traditional backers. Countries in Central Asia, like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have distanced themselves from the Kremlin, expressing disinterest in deepening cooperation with Russia. Armenia is also disillusioned, believing it was let down by the Kremlin, which had served as the guarantor of peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Russian industry is also losing customers even within BRICS, which was initially intended as an economic alliance based on mutual benefits. Meanwhile, founding countries such as Brazil and India have ceased purchasing arms and equipment from Russia, opting instead for Western European alternatives.

Putin has limited options, needing active allies to provide military and economic support rather than passive political backers like China, Serbia, Hungary, or certain American Republicans.

China presents an intriguing case. It maintains economic relations with the West while supporting Russia internationally. Russia and China have bolstered their economic and military ties despite Western pressure for China to condemn the invasion.

Global sanctions on Russia benefit China, allowing it to purchase energy resources at a reduced cost. Since the war began, Russian coal and oil exports to China have doubled. Last year, trade between the two countries amounted to CAD 320 billion. On the flip side, Western European countries and the USA remain China's largest markets. Beijing attempts to maintain a balance, showing more goodwill towards Moscow.

This was evident in 2023, when Beijing positioned itself as a potential mediator. In January of the previous year, a document titled "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" was released, intended as a peace plan.

The West and Ukraine responded cautiously. The plan overlooked the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, only mentioning "respect for sovereignty, guarantees of independence, and territorial integrity of all countries." Additionally, Chinese proposals coincided with Chinese-Russian talks on military cooperation and "referenda", which Kremlin propaganda claimed legitimized the "annexation" of the occupied Ukrainian regions to Russia.

Beijing denied supplying weapons to Russia, and there is indeed no evidence of such activity. However, it provides trucks, off-road vehicles, and motorcycles, which the Russian army uses at the Ukrainian front. China also supplies engines for attack drones, communication equipment, and light drones.

Putin's desperation for allies to support him materially in the ongoing war is clear from his foreign visits. Two years ago, it would have been unimaginable for him to visit Pyongyang or Hanoi. Those capitals did not hold significance for the Kremlin. However, the situation has transformed.

This year, Putin visited China, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Turkmenistan, where he met with Iranian President Masud Pezeszkian, as well as Belarus and North Korea. All these countries have not recognized international sanctions or the decisions of the International Criminal Court in The Hague to arrest Putin.

While the first four states decided against providing military aid, the outcasts of global politics saw this as a chance to strengthen economic ties and gain Kremlin backing on the international scene. This is vital for both Iran and North Korea, whose economies lag technologically due to global sanctions. Cooperation with Russia promises development opportunities.

Both countries hope to transfer technology and expertise in designing and building intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Aviation and intelligence cooperation, particularly economic intelligence, is also of great interest.

To date, Putin has mostly recruited dictators akin to himself. Even countries that disregard sanctions and demonstrate friendly neutrality do not want to follow their lead. He finds it challenging to locate allies who would openly support him. Attempts in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and in Venezuela, where he backs the authoritarian president, Nicolas Maduro, have all been rebuffed.

Little progress has been made towards "creating a new Eurasian architecture of cooperation, indivisible security, and development," as Putin described the project, although the West remains slightly concerned about the increasing polarization among developing countries. Will Putin succeed in building a new axis of evil? Much will depend on the role China chooses to play. In Beijing, pragmatic thinking prevails, hence the Kremlin's persistent attempts.

The Russia-China relationship does not thrive from Putin's rapprochement with Kim Jong-un. Beijing fears increased Russian influence in North Korea. The long-term effects of this cooperation could enhance the DPRK's military capabilities, compelling a stronger American military presence in the region and potentially threatening Beijing's interests.