NATO's critical summit: Challenges in support for Ukraine

Without receiving a decisive response, Russia will escalate, potentially attacking neighbouring NATO countries, says Oleksandr V. Danylyuk to Wirtualna Polska. The Ukrainian expert believes that the most crucial decision at the NATO summit will be establishing a long-term support fund for Kyiv, independent of the elections in individual member countries.

Tatiana Kolesnychenko, Wirtualna Polska: The NATO anniversary summit dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Alliance’s founding will begin in Washington today. For several months, American politicians have announced that it will be if not groundbreaking, at least the most ambitious meeting since the Cold War. What do you expect from this summit?

Oleksandr V. Danylyuk*, Chairman of the Center for Defense Reforms, cooperating with Ukrainian authorities in the defence, security, and intelligence sectors: I certainly do not expect any breakthrough decisions. I assume there will be declarations that NATO will continue to support Ukraine. Maybe a specific amount of military aid will be announced. That’s all. Will it change anything? In my opinion, no. The invasion of Ukraine has been ongoing for the third year. It is the biggest crisis in Europe since World War II, and NATO still does not have a coherent strategy to deter Russia.

This strategy is supposed to be one of the critical elements of the summit. According to Jens Stoltenberg, the outgoing Secretary General of NATO today has forces “at a scale unseen in decades.” 500,000 troops in full readiness, and within five years, allies plan to acquire thousands of air defence systems, artillery, and 850 modern aircraft. You can criticize the West for its sluggishness, but you must admit that the invasion has strengthened the Alliance.

Let’s start with the fact that NATO was created to protect Europe from Soviet aggression. European countries provided the USA with their military infrastructure and committed to developing their defence capabilities. In return, the United States was to protect the old continent from Soviet expansion.

Hence, the US military presence in Europe was significant. Still, the most crucial stabilizing element was the demonstration of readiness – especially in the 1950s and 1960s – to immediately use nuclear weapons in case of an attack on allied countries. This was crucial because, regarding troop numbers and equipment, NATO's capabilities were much more modest than those of the Warsaw Pact countries.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence was successful because, after World War II, there were no armed conflicts between the Soviet Union and the West. For years, Europe lived without the fear that war could break out again. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia ceased to be seen as a potential threat. There were not even concrete plans for how to respond in case of a crisis.

From the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been blackmailing the West with the use of nuclear weapons, but NATO avoids engaging in this discourse because no one wants a return to the Cold War and a new nuclear arms race. So, there are no plans to strengthen atomic capabilities or expand the nuclear sharing program to additional allies. Instead, the Alliance is increasing its presence in countries bordering Russia.

Yes, but the number of units in countries bordering Russia is still tiny. They cannot independently withstand Russian aggression. So, it is a meaningful gesture of solidarity but not a real solution. Russia stops in places where it knows it will immediately face a decisive response. It now perceives the Baltic states as grey zones, territories for potential expansion.

In the event of potential aggression, the Baltic states would become a battlefield before reinforcements arrived. Ukraine's example shows how difficult it is to reclaim occupied territories. In the south of Ukraine alone, Moscow has occupied a larger area than the Baltic states combined.

We are still in a situation where Western leaders' and NATO's response remains inadequate to the level of threat Russia poses today. The West still does not understand that the Kremlin is at war with the entire West. But Russia is not just at war with Ukraine. In its perception, it is at war with the entire West, including NATO. This view is also widespread in Global South countries. Without a decisive response, Russia will escalate, potentially attacking neighbouring NATO countries.

Let's return to the summit in Washington. Volodymyr Zelensky and Central European countries had hoped that this time, Kyiv would receive a membership negotiation proposal from NATO. But as the summit approaches, it becomes clear that the situation from last year's summit in Vilnius will repeat itself. Will Ukraine once again not hear a concrete proposal?

There were no hopes for a concrete proposal last year; the same is true now. The fact that Ukrainian authorities publicly demanded an invitation to membership negotiations had nothing to do with analysts' assessments of old NATO’s readiness to take such steps, particularly the USA's. The question of Ukraine joining the Alliance has been artificial for many years. It's worth considering why this happens.

Because it’s another red line set by the Kremlin? NATO enlargement, including Ukraine and Georgia, would be perceived in Moscow as an escalation. Ukrainian experts often highlight that the situation essentially boils down to Russia having an informal veto in NATO.

At this stage, Russia is winning the psychological war with the West because it knows exactly which buttons to press at any given moment. It does not want Ukraine in NATO, just as it does not want any other country to join the Alliance or exist at all because NATO is a shield against Russia’s expansion—not a threat but an obstacle to it.

So, at present, formal NATO membership for Ukraine is impossible. Any talks about it are artificially inflated. Moreover, at this stage, granting candidate status will not help Ukraine.

Why wouldn’t it help?

The situation is black and white. Ukraine will enter NATO only if it wins the war. Then, the path to the Alliance will be smooth and straightforward.

We don’t need formal gestures, like an invitation to negotiate, but weapons to win the war. Suppose the USA is afraid of granting Ukraine candidate status because it considers it an escalatory step. In that case, it is more effective to demand that military aid come when needed and in quantities appropriate to the situation.

At this stage, the West, especially the United States, which accounts for 70% of NATO’s total potential, is still not ready to take even such a step. Yet transferring weapons is a much simpler decision that does not require the consent of the entire Alliance.

Even when the United States approves large aid packages, less than half of that money goes to help Ukraine. The rest are programs that often have nothing to do with this war. For example, from the latest package of CAD 83 billion (USD 61 billion), CAD 31 billion (USD 23 billion) is for replenishing its own arsenal due to transferred equipment, and CAD 15 billion (USD 11 billion) for maintaining US forces in the region. Only CAD 19 billion (USD 14 billion) will be used to purchase weapons for Ukraine.

Previously, Germany included funds for the development of democracy in Romania among the expenditures declared as support for Ukraine. At least the White House spends those funds on rearming itself.

I understand that from Washington’s perspective, it is interconnected. They give away weapons, weakening their military potential, so they need to rebuild it simultaneously. However, it is not fair to show these funds as aid for Ukraine. Baltic countries, which provide Ukraine with a significant percentage of their GDP, do not do such things.

Ukraine can still win this war, but it needs the provided arms to match the challenges it faces. And that requires increasing the efficiency of existing aid programs. It is also evident that the scale of the conflict requires the West to revise its entire arms industry. Let me give a simple example. Producing a 155 mm artillery shell, supplied to Ukraine, costs ten times more than a Russian 152 mm shell. Under these conditions, we won’t even reach parity, not to mention superiority.

Are you talking about switching the European economy to a war footing? Can you imagine a situation where the government of France, Germany, or Poland announces to their voters that they are cutting funding for culture or education in favour of arming Ukraine? The West will never match Russia in the ease of spending money on war because it has to consider the opinion of its societies, which do not feel threatened enough to give up their comfort.

Of course, I can imagine that. Why is Russia experiencing economic growth despite sanctions? Because it has shifted its economy to a war footing. For Europe, which is now experiencing a decline in economic development, this could be an opportunity to create new jobs and production capacities.

And then Russia will experience an equally sharp decline because jobs created for war needs will eventually have to be liquidated.

Existing lines can be switched to the production of civilian goods. That’s what the USA did after World War II. First, they expanded production capacities for the army and then switched them to commercial activities. This built the economic power of today’s United States.

We must understand that Russia will continue to wage war as long as it has funds for it. Now, it has reached the limit of its capabilities because in 2023, it spent CAD 138 billion (USD 100 billion) on the war. That’s about 30% of the state budget. Ukraine has fewer resources, although the West has an obvious economic advantage.

For example, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cost American taxpayers CAD 2.4 trillion (USD 1.7 trillion). Meanwhile, the total US military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion has been about CAD 64.3 billion (USD 46 billion). We keep coming back to the same place: there are too few weapons, and they arrive too late. This gives Russia a clear signal that the West lacks the determination to achieve Ukraine’s victory, and it only encourages upping the ante. The Kremlin is convinced that the West can be waited out and then pressured to concede.

Even with Trump's help, who may soon be president again? According to leaks, during the NATO summit, a plan to create a long-term support fund for Kyiv will be presented. In the Western press, NATO officials say that this move is motivated by fear of Trump's return to power and an attempt to make arms supplies independent of political turbulence in allied countries.

The announcement of the fund’s creation is a very positive signal. It shows the evolution the Alliance has undergone. In 2022, NATO was more than cautious. There was no talk of providing Ukraine with offensive weapons; only humanitarian programs were in operation. Now, it is a declaration that NATO is taking on long-term commitments. The problem is that such decisions should have been made immediately after the invasion, not in its third year. Perhaps then Putin would not have had an appetite to move from a blitzkrieg, which he lost, to a protracted war of attrition.

As for Trump, predicting or analyzing what he will do after coming to power is pure speculation. Even if he regains control, from Ukraine's point of view, it doesn't have to be a catastrophic scenario. During Joe Biden's administration, Ukraine was not in a good situation. Again, I'll emphasize that weapons did not reach Kyiv at the appropriate speed in critical moments.

However, Trump supporters blocked military aid for Ukraine in Congress over the past six months, leading to a severe ammunition shortage and the consequent loss of locations like Avdiivka.

As the Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces, Biden had enormous opportunities to provide military aid to Ukraine, bypassing Congress. He could have activated the previously approved Lend-Lease. But he didn’t want to do that, which is Ukraine’s greatest tragedy.

After three years of war, we already understand how decisions are made in the White House. Biden's administration, like the entire West, fears confrontation with Russia. It fears a severe internal crisis, collapse, or even a regime change of Putin.

The problem lies in this fear. The truth is that the West would like to make a deal with Putin. It believes that eventually, Russia will get tired, and then some agreement can be pushed through. Of course, the West wouldn’t mind Kyiv reclaiming some of its territories, but that is not the goal. Some parts will be returned, and some will be taken by Russia as a trophy—in other words, a Korean scenario.

Would it be different with Trump? He hasn’t even become president yet, and there are already leaks that he’s preparing a “peace plan,” contemplating which part of Ukraine to give to Russia.

Leaks – that’s the keyword. It’s the end of the election campaign, and there’s a lot of speculation. Judging these speculations as very realistic is a very ungrateful task. In my opinion, there is no "peace plan" by Trump. Remembering how he came to power last time and how he behaved, I think his only real plan is to win the presidential election. It's the same with Biden, for whom the presidential race in the USA is more important now than the war in Ukraine.

Trump is entirely different, and we cannot predict his behaviour now. Of course, he may assume that the USA has other priorities. However, failure in Ukraine would be political suicide for him, as it would be for any American politician.

Tatiana Kolesnychenko, journalist at Wirtualna Polska

*Oleksandr V. Danylyuk is the chairman of the Center for Defense Reforms, which cooperates with Ukrainian authorities in the defence, security, and intelligence sectors. Before the war, he was, among others, the chief advisor to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, a special advisor to the head of the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service, an assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and a long-term member of the Parliamentary Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats. In recent years, he coordinated the Ukraine-NATO platform for early detection and countering hybrid threats. He is the creator and lecturer of a training course for senior public officials on countering hybrid threats conducted jointly with King's College London.