Ukrainian drones outmaneuver Russian jamming systems on battlefield

The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted to everyone the effectiveness of drones in war and how essential methods of protection against them are. Drones monitor the battlefield, coordinate artillery fire, or conduct kinetic attacks.

Both Ukrainians and Russians use a mix of military and commercial drones. For the defenders, military drones include Polish drones like FlyEye and Warmate from the WB Group or Norwegian Black Hornet. The Russians, on the other hand, use drones like Orlan or Zala Kub-BLA.

The second group includes small drones assembled from readily available parts, such as those from the Mavic family and larger ones like the Matrice family. These are used to destroy abandoned Russian equipment in no man's land, the terrain between the positions of both armies and to deliver medical aid to the wounded.

Additionally, both sides use machines with a high payload to drop grenades or mortar shells on the opponent. Small drones are "kamikaze" machines known as "death mosquitoes." Drones have also been used to demine or plant mines.

Despite their delicate build, drones are formidable opponents to combat. These small machines have a radar signature similar to birds, which means older anti-aircraft radar systems often do not detect them, mistaking them for background noise and not displaying them on the operator's screen.

Newer systems use algorithms that distinguish birds from drones based on flight characteristics, but the detection range remains a problem. A machine flying low over the ground may be detected only a few kilometres away, making it challenging to create an inexpensive and tight barrier along the entire frontline.

Infrared systems supported by a laser rangefinder are also not ideal, as drones made of composites that poorly emit heat and are powered by electric motors are less visible on thermal images than missiles.

Theoretically, the simplest solution is to use electronic warfare systems that can detect the presence of enemy drones through frequency monitoring and determine their location. This way, the Russians bombarded drone launch and landing sites at the beginning of the war.

Furthermore, these systems can interrupt, for example, real-time video transmission, take control of the drone, or disrupt GPS and satellite navigation, forcing automatic landing or crashing to the ground.

However, it's worth noting that sometimes opponents may adapt their drones to frequencies not covered by jamming systems. This causes a constant race between jammer system creators and drone manufacturers. During the ongoing war, there have been periods of both impunity and inability to use commercial drones by a given side.

Now, based on information from the Russians and the increased number of video materials featuring the use of FPV-type drones, it seems the "pendulum" has swung back to Ukraine. However, such a state won't last forever, as over time, the Russians will tune their jammers again by analyzing drone wreckage.

These are often modified Chinese solutions, and as a Russian points out, only a few systems produced on a small scale are effective. Usually, they are made "on the fly" with the help of hobbyists.

The only solution in such conditions is autonomous drones, like the professional FlyEye drones. In the case of FPV drones, the essential approach would be to use solutions that enable the identification and attack of targets without involving a pilot.

Theoretically, this is possible since appropriate solutions already exist in modern anti-tank-guided missiles with a "fire and forget" feature. Such missiles, like the Brimstone, can independently detect and attack a target in a given area or use a predictive line of attack similar to the system known from NLAW missiles. In such a case, the jammers will be powerless, and the only solution would be physically eliminating the drone.