Russia's demographic crisis deepens amid conflict and reform

The issue of Russia's shrinking population has been a concern in the Kremlin for years. As early as the 1990s, experts warned that the transition to a market economy would lead to a temporary drop in birth rates. They also assumed that with increased wealth, improved healthcare, and longer life expectancy, the situation would improve.

Indeed, after a prolonged decline, the number of births in Russia began to steadily increase from 2006, peaking in 2014 when 1.943 million children were born. However, from then on, births have declined year by year, a trend Russian demographers attribute to a crisis in the Federation. Consequently, by the end of 2022, the birth rate had decreased by 6.7% to 1.304 million. Estimates suggest that this year, only 1.2 million children will be born, and next year there will be 100,000 fewer.

From the Kremlin's perspective, another alarming issue between 2014 and 2015 was the rise in deaths, accompanying the decline in births. Previously, over the past 12 years, Russian mortality had been steadily decreasing. The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection attributes this trend reversal to significant issues within the healthcare system, which is becoming increasingly inaccessible, and to deepening socio-economic difficulties.

The most frequently cited issues are alcoholism and generally unhealthy lifestyles among Russians. After alcohol, the second most common cause of death is tobacco.

Experts from the Center for Scientific Thought, Politics, and Ideology have concluded that the main cause of Russia’s demographic crisis is flawed economic policy and a shift to a free market—at least in theory. This happened while overlooking the demographic aspects of these reforms. Additionally, they suggest, which indeed can be considered an ideological stance, that the "Russian person" has been drawn towards consumerism, losing religiosity in the process.

Regardless of the causes, according to the state statistical agency, between 2020-2021, Russia's population fell by 1.3 million, with deaths exceeding births by 1.7 million. This decline was most significant among ethnic Russians, whose numbers, according to the 2021 census, dropped by 5.4 million compared to the period from 2010 to 2021. Therefore, the problems began even before the attack on Ukraine. Currently, Russia's population is about 143.5 million, whereas at the beginning of the century, it was 146.3 million.

Declining birth rates will result in fewer conscripts for the army, which is a concern for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The ministry had been wary of this situation since the beginning of the century. At that time, it was estimated that between 2010 and 2025, the number of potential conscripts aged 20 to 29 would decrease by 44%.

In March 2020, then Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported that the number of conscripts had fallen to 225,000, almost 100,000 less than five years earlier. The proposed solution was contractual service to partially compensate for the reduction in conscription numbers.

While the army began to slowly reach its expected size, Putin started the war, overturning the entire reform and necessitating changes to conscription rules yet again. The first reform arising from wartime experiences was launched by the Kremlin in the fall of 2022. At that time, they decided to increase the army's personnel for the first time and started regular training for reserves, of which there are over 25 million men. However, many of these reservists are in such poor health that they are unfit for active service.

The authorities then decided to mobilize an additional 500,000 conscripts and raised the upper age limit for conscription by three years, from 27 to 30. The lower age limit remained at 18 years.

Nevertheless, the rising losses suggest that the army is still not large enough. Therefore, the Russians prepared another reform and decided to further increase the army's size to a target of 1.5 million soldiers. However, the minimum conscription age was raised to 21.

The Russians concluded that eighteen-year-olds are still too young, lacking full physical capability and finding combat too challenging. Another reason, openly expressed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, is the desire to protect the already low population of young men, a situation further impacted by the war.

Although politicians were aware of the demographic problems, they failed to act systematically for a long time. It was only in the Unified Plan for Achieving National Development Goals adopted in the fall of 2021 that initial measures appeared, aimed at improving birth rates. It was stated that stabilization should be achieved by 2030.

However, the focus was not on increasing life expectancy and improving healthcare quality. The government mainly concentrated on encouraging women to give birth. Incentives included monthly payments related to childbirth and child-rearing, the provision of so-called maternal capital that translates into future pension benefits, and favourable conditions for mortgage applications.

The direct outcome of these benefits resembled Poland's 500+ program—the birth rate not only did not rise, but it began to fall more quickly. The causes of failure were also similar to those seen in Poland's flagship PiS program. Surveyed women cited poor healthcare during pregnancy and for infants, a lack of nursery and kindergarten facilities, and an unstable political situation in the country. Now, there is also another factor—the "special military operation."

According to experts, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the announcement of partial mobilization became a demographic test for the country. The Gaidar Institute highlights negative factors including the worsening economic situation, the conscription of some men into the military, and heightened anxiety levels.

To alleviate the latter, Sardana Avksentiyeva, a deputy to the State Duma and deputy head of the New People faction, proposed introducing a four-day workweek for parents in Russia. Avksentiyeva noted that for many working mothers, a four-day workweek would be a relief. She hopes to restore balance between work and personal life for employees and encourages women to consider having children if they have more time for their family.

However, this suggestion could be problematic as Russian industry, already operating in wartime modes, complains about a chronic lack of workforce. So far, the Duma has endorsed a four-day workweek for families with many children and single-parent families.

Experts also point out that the authorities do not consider another aspect: over 300,000 men have been killed during military operations. As demographer Igor Yefremov, quoted by banki.ru, points out, the number of births has noticeably declined in regions with more male participation in operations.

In Krasnoyarsk Krai, the birth rate fell from 1.5 children per woman in 2021 to 1.22 in 2023; in Buryatia from 1.87 to 1.59; in the Kaliningrad region from 1.38 to 1.17; and in the Pskov region from 1.49 to 1.29. During the same period, deaths exceeded births by 495,000. Last year, in the first nine months alone, deaths surpassed births by nearly 676,000.

In comments under articles, Russians joke that the State Duma might soon consider allowing polygamy to save the demographic situation and prevent the entry of refugees. Meanwhile, the industry is increasingly open to those from former Soviet republics and South Asia. With the rising mortality rate of Russian men, the Kremlin may have no choice but to open the borders wider.

Slawek Zagorski