Nuclear myth and reality: The red button that wasn't
"My button is stronger. And it works," stated the then-President of the United States, Donald Trump, in 2018. He was responding to threats from North Korea's leader, who was intimidating the USA with the prospect of a nuclear attack. In truth, a nuclear red button does not exist, although it often serves as a metaphor for a tool initiating a nuclear exchange. As with every myth, there is a grain of truth to it.
The red button, which supposedly starts a global nuclear conflict when pressed by the leader of a nuclear power, is one of the popular myths in pop culture. The vision of world destruction initiated by the push of a button captivates the imagination but—at least in the case of the United States—is entirely fictional.
Desk with a red button
American presidents work at a unique piece of furniture, the Resolute desk, made from the wood of the ship of the same name. On an Arctic rescue mission in the mid-19th century, the British vessel became icebound. Years later, it was found by an American whaler, towed to port, and repaired at the expense of the USA before being returned to Great Britain.
When the Resolute ended its service under the British flag years later, Queen Victoria had four desks made from its wood. She gifted one of them to President Rutherford Hayes. A plaque on it reads: "A desk made from the wood of a ship was presented by the queen of Great Britain to the president of the United States as a token of the noble and kind act of restoring the Resolute."
This very desk remains in the White House in the middle of the Oval Office. Over the years, a small wooden box with a red button sat on its surface.
During Trump's presidency, the button was used to order Diet Coke, but previous presidents also used it to summon staff. It can be seen on the desks of Presidents Obama and Bush, who introduced this element into presidential equipment. Joe Biden did not continue the tradition—during his term, the button disappeared from the Resolute desk.
Single responsibility
This, however, did not affect the ability of the American president to independently make the decision to destroy the world. The United States is unique in this regard.
When the president of Russia needs a suitcase with the Czeget communication system and the cooperation of the minister of defence or the chief of the general staff (or—according to some sources—both of them) to initiate a nuclear attack, the president of the United States makes the decision alone, although theoretically, he should consult with advisors beforehand.
The fate of the world depends on the decision and judgment of one person, who—upon winning the election—begins to shoulder the responsibility associated with potentially giving the order to execute a nuclear attack.
Six minutes to decide
Pulitzer Prize-winner Annie Jacobsen details this in her recently published book in the US, "Nuclear War: A Possible Scenario."
According to the information she obtained, the time window to activate the American nuclear arsenal is just six minutes. That's how much time the American president has to assess the situation and decide to launch the missiles.
How to start nuclear armageddon?
The initiation of American nuclear weapons does not involve the mythical red button but the "football." This term refers to a black briefcase that the president always has with him, carried by one of the accompanying officers.
Like the Russian Czeget system, the briefcase contains communication tools and several documents with scenarios for a nuclear strike. The president chooses one of them and confirms his identity using a presidential code card.
The identity—but not the order to attack—is verified in two stages: by the responsible officer and remotely by the Secretary of Defense. They only verify the person giving the order is the president and the authenticity of launch codes, and passing the order through the chain of command is supposed to occur automatically.
How do we know the president isn't insane?
This single responsibility for nuclear war, effectively the destruction of the world, sparked a debate in the American Senate a few years ago. Concerns were raised about security weaknesses: if the president wanted to destroy the world for an irrational reason, there are no procedures or legally established ways to stop him.
Doubts are not new—during a 1975 training session on the procedure to initiate a nuclear attack, Major Harold Hering asked: "How do I know that the order I received to launch my missiles comes from a president in his right mind?"
Instead of an answer, the major was immediately dismissed from service. The justification was "failing to demonstrate desired leadership qualities" and a military statement that knowing whether an order was issued legally is beyond the competence of the officer tasked with executing it.
