America's evolving war doctrine and global military reach

The President of the United States is the formal and actual commander of the American armed forces. Although the formal declaration of war on another nation is within Congress's competence, the president serves as the Commander-in-Chief. The strength of this position is evidenced by practice: although Congress last declared war in 1942, the United States has been continuously in conflicts for nearly a century.

From the perspective of American law, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the actions in Grenada and Panama, strikes on Libya, the Persian Gulf War, and the subsequent engagements in Iraq or Afghanistan were not considered wars. According to regulations, these were "hostilities" or providing allies with "limited support."

This casuistic puzzle is defined by documents such as the 1973 enacted "War Powers Resolution" (WPR) or subsequent "Authorization for the Use of Military Force" (AUMF) resolutions. It is these that provide the American president with extraordinary capabilities,

Although his freedom of action is limited by detailed regulations, in practice, he can independently, after consulting advisors, initiate and conduct war (including nuclear war), which is not formally considered a war. He has exceptional tools on a global scale for this: the United States Armed Forces.

The American armed forces are currently undergoing significant changes. These result from a new geopolitical situation, leading to a different assessment of priorities and threats from two decades ago. The Pentagon is moving away from solutions developed under the influence of the Cold War's end, the Warsaw Pact's dissolution, and the Soviet Union.

For years, the army of the only global hegemon was the guarantor of maintaining a global order favourable to the West. It served as an expeditionary force, fighting enemies that were not only smaller but also poorly organized and, above all, completely dominated by American technological superiority.

According to the Pentagon, those times are in the past, and the ongoing reorganization of the American armed forces is a testament to the changes. Its significance is clearly demonstrated by the fact that in 2022 — for the first time in 40 years — a new doctrine was published: a set of assumptions regarding how Americans are to fight.

The "Field Manual 3.0" document assumes that the U.S. armed forces will conduct Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), where the fight occurs simultaneously on land, sea, and in the air, but also in space and cyberspace. Readiness for such activities is provided by six types of armed forces.

The Space Force is the youngest component of the American armed forces – formed in 2019, still being developed, and responsible, among other things, for missions involving military shuttles like the X-37. The Coast Guard also has special status – although formally part of the armed forces, it is not under the Department of Defense but belongs to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

What distinguishes the American armed forces is their formal and actual readiness for global action. This is facilitated by dividing the planet into several areas of responsibility – each with its command.

The scale of operations is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the American armed forces are stationed — outside their homeland — in approximately 750 bases (depending on the methodology, some sources even cite 850) spread across more than 80 different countries.

Besides commands with a specified territorial scope of responsibility, there are also commands without such an assignment, responsible for special forces, joint forces consisting of various cooperating armed forces, transportation, and strategic forces.

The latter are responsible for the American nuclear triad, consisting of submarines with UGM-133 Trident II nuclear missiles, strategic bombers capable of carrying B61 nuclear bombs, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the LGM-30G Minuteman III.

The largest component of the United States Armed Forces is the Army, including the National Guard, with about 450,000 soldiers. For several years, it has undergone a significant transformation, from an expeditionary force into one capable of conducting full-scale conflict.

This means limiting the role of the previously dominant brigade combat teams, consisting of several thousand soldiers. Higher organizational levels are gaining significance – corps and divisions, providing better coordination of actions and support when tens of thousands of soldiers are fighting simultaneously, not merely hundreds or thousands.

These changes lead to limiting various support units and "light" units – ongoing debate in the USA concerns the future of brigades using Stryker wheeled armoured vehicles. "Heavy" units are gaining significance, whose expansion and reorganization (including changes in the number and composition of companies in a battalion) mean the number of battle-ready tanks and infantry fighting vehicles will increase by 20-30 per cent.

The American Navy plays an exceptional role: it guarantees the United States free navigation and trade, forming the foundation of the U.S. economy and much of the West. For this purpose, it possesses unique tools in the form of 11 aircraft carriers, also known as supercarriers due to their size and capabilities.

A generational replacement of supercarriers is currently underway – Nimitz-class ships are gradually being replaced by Gerald R. Ford-class vessels of similar size and appearance but much more modern.

These ships form the core of the fleet, around which carrier strike groups are built, consisting of up to a dozen warships of various classes. For decades, American dominance on the seas has been ensured by the AEGIS combat system, allowing the creation of an effective anti-aircraft "umbrella" over a ship group and the defended area.

The submarine component consists exclusively of nuclear-powered ships. These include "boomers" – Ohio-class vessels carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBM) with nuclear warheads, and multi-role ships (Los Angeles, Seawolf, and Virginia classes) capable of combating shipping, anti-submarine warfare, reconnaissance activities, and supporting special forces, as well as conventional attacks on land targets.

Reorganization on the scale occurring in the Army is also taking place in the Marine Corps. During the so-called war on terror, marine units became similar to army units, losing their original character as forces primarily intended for amphibious operations.

The Corps is now returning to its roots – it has been stripped of some heavy equipment, including armoured units.

The reorganization of marines focuses on adapting the formation to the realities of modern warfare in the Pacific. New assumptions include conducting operations in extremely hostile environments where the saturation of enemy arms will be so high that the use of large amphibious ships, which have been the marine forces' logistic backbone, will become impossible.

The changes are also affecting the U.S. Air Force. For years, a trend has been observed that keeps Pentagon's top commanders awake at night: the number of combat aircraft and trained pilots is systematically decreasing.

This is the result of a limited budget and the radical increase in the cost of new aircraft, with the F-35 costing approximately CAD 114 million and the latest F-15 variant – F-15EX – even around CAD 134 million. One of the consequences is – as indicated by the Air Force – a limitation in the ability to provide close air support.

Under such conditions, Americans are looking for ways to break the impasse by researching unmanned or optionally manned systems and funding research on future aircraft being developed, among others, under the NGAD program. Its execution is at risk, as it turned out that a future combat aircraft could cost up to CAD 403 million.

The proposed solution to the problem includes ideas to change the way combat aircraft are designed and procured. Revolutionary new generations of aircraft developed over decades would be replaced with continuous development and regular procurement of relatively small batches of equipment.

This would ensure the ongoing modernization of the Air Force while also reducing costs and the risk of failure associated with very ambitious but singular programs to build new types of aircraft.