New leadership faces uphill battle in reshaping roscosmos

On Thursday, February 6 Vladimir Putin appointed a new head of Roscosmos, responsible for Russia's space programs. Dmitry Bakanov, the new director-general, replaced Yuri Borisov at the helm of the agency.

Bakanov was born in Lenin's City (now Baikonur) in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1985. Twenty-two years later, he graduated from St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance. He quickly became involved with the space sector, leading companies like the Gonets Satellite System (an operator of transmission and communication systems for Roscosmos). From 2011 to 2025, he worked for the Ministry of Transport, serving as Deputy Minister since 2022. Bakanov brings experience and competency to manage Roscosmos, but he faces a difficult task.

Borisov had led the agency since 2022. He took over from Dmitry Rogozin, who was head of Roscosmos from 2018 to 2022, and previously served as Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Space Industries. Like his successor, Borisov was supposed to lead Roscosmos into a new era. The plans were ambitious: more rocket launches, investments in satellite constellations, and a withdrawal from participation in the International Space Station (ISS) program, opting to build Russia's own station. However, little of this was achieved.

The Russian Space Agency (Roscosmos, for short) directly replaced the Soviet space program, which lacked a central oversight body. Roscosmos was established by a decree from President Boris Yeltsin on February 25, 1992. It shared the fate of the state in which it was founded: the 1990s were marked by a deep financial crisis, though Roscosmos was somewhat saved by commercial flights. With the economic improvement under Vladimir Putin, Roscosmos seemed to regain its former condition, carrying out several scientific missions (e.g., Koronas Foton, Spektr R). However, controversy arose over the enormous expenses associated with participation in the ISS. The reorganization during 2013-2016 and the subsequent period of Rogozin's leadership brought some optimism, but not for long.

Even under Rogozin's leadership, Roscosmos began to withdraw from international projects, including the Lunar Gateway program led by NASA and participation in the ESA spaceport program in Kourou, French Guiana. Instead, a partnership was formed with the Chinese National Space Agency to construct a lunar base. However, Borisov was unable to resolve the issues plaguing Roscosmos.

The number of rocket launches remained very low. For example, in 2023, Russia sent only 19 launch rockets into space. In the same period, the USA sent 110 rockets, and China sent 66. In the first three quarters of 2024, Russian rockets achieved fewer than 10 successful launches.

This is not surprising, as the modern Angara A5 launch vehicle program is experiencing significant delays due to technical problems. The successor to the Proton M, developed since 1995, debuted in 2014 but since then has launched only a few times, often after multiple postponements. For instance, last year's April launch was delayed by several days due to an initial fault in the pressure increasing system of one of the tanks, and the next day due to a failure in the engine start control system.

Americans, Chinese, or Europeans encounter issues as well, but they have entirely different resources and scientific and technical potential. The Angara A5 launches were conducted, among others, from the new Vostochny Cosmodrome, a project marked by incompetence: over 17,000 legal and standard violations were recorded during its construction, resulting in 140 criminal cases and estimated losses of several billion rubles (approximately hundreds of millions in Canadian dollars).

The situation with satellites was equally concerning. Last year, Borisov announced that by 2036, Russia aims to have 2,600 satellites in orbit. One key project is the Sfera system, Russia's equivalent of the famed Starlink. Initially, the goal was 600 satellites, then reduced to 360, funded for 162, with money acquired for about 80, although the demand was as high as 1,200. The aim was to produce no fewer than 250 satellites annually of all types. According to Western information agencies, in practice, Russia produces about 15 satellites of all types per year, though theoretically, it could produce more, even up to 40. However, the full production capacity remains far from being utilized, let alone their development.

The outlook for the Russian Orbital Space Station (ROSS) is also bleak. Planned construction is set to start in 2027, with the first manned flight anticipated in 2028. The station is expected to consist of up to seven modules by 2035, with the crew onboard only part of the time - a highly automated facility. Even Russian analysts cautiously predict that the program may be too ambitious for the Russian space industry, much like the Luna 25 lunar probe lost in 2023.

The causes of the Roscosmos crisis are both simple and complex. Simple, as they generally arise from Russia’s broader state issues. Without the Russian invasion of Ukraine, access to Western technologies wouldn't be hindered by sanctions (although not entirely airtight), Roscosmos wouldn't be excluded from some Western space missions (such as the ExoMars rover program by ESA), and Roscosmos would have much higher income from exports. The latter -- derived from services and rocket engine sales -- fell by about 90 per cent after the invasion.

While the war in Ukraine will eventually end, and sanctions may be lifted some time thereafter, new players in the market like SpaceX, Blue Origin, or state agencies from India and Japan won't easily relinquish their newfound customer base. The complexities also stem from Roscosmos's internal problems, partly resulting from inefficient management and partly from technical backwardness, which some analysts believe sanctions will exacerbate by 10-20 years.

Thus, Bakanov faces a daunting task. Can he manage to prevent further decline in Roscosmos? It seems unlikely. Although Bakanov has significant administrative and space industry experience, he is not a miracle worker. The head of Roscosmos has changed, but Roscosmos remains, even according to Russian reports, an inefficient and corrupt institution that is also underfunded.