Future of the USAF: Balancing NGAD dreams and budget realities

In the first half of July, the United States Air Force (USAF) announced that the NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance) fighter program might face financial difficulties due to budget constraints for the 2025 fiscal year. Although the US Armed Forces are the wealthiest service of this kind in the world, they still cannot freely use financial resources without limits.

Thus, USAF Secretary Frank Kendall stated that the future NGAD might require program reorganization and changes in technical requirements to reduce costs. One future 6th generation fighter is expected to cost $400 million CAD. For comparison, the contemporary lighter F-35A costs almost $140 million CAD.

One way to cut costs is to give up the expensive ($5.8 billion CAD until 2023) revolutionary NGAP (Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion) engine, which is planned to have high performance with low fuel consumption.

Despite the enormous challenges associated with the B-21 Raider (new strategic bomber) program and LGM-35A Sentinel (new intercontinental ballistic missile – both are to form two of the three segments of the American nuclear triad), the USAF must retain the ability to continue the equally important NGAD program. However, it has been somewhat frozen for the verification of some requirements.

Kendall stated that simpler, cheaper solutions in some areas, or in other words, compromises, are necessary. This could help NGAD avoid the fate of the F-22A Raptor, also a revolutionary machine, which faced a reduction in the order from 750 to less than 200 units due to high costs. The Raptor was to replace the more numerous F-15, but the aging Eagle is still in production, while the innovative machine is not.

The NGAD is not just an aircraft (referred to as the NGAD platform) but an entire system – the next-generation fighter is designed to operate in a complex ecosystem, supported by various types of drones, cooperating with other manned aircraft (especially the F-35) and support planes (AWACS, etc.). There could also be some simplifications in this regard.

So far, it has not been announced which capabilities the successor to the F-22 might forgo. This is likely the main subject of ongoing arrangements and consultations. This represents a glimmer of hope, as in June, some Pentagon representatives predicted the possible end of the NGAD program for financial reasons.

Nonetheless, the USAF must prepare for the potential effects of possibly giving up the efficient NGAP engines, which consume 20-25% less fuel, especially in the face of challenges requiring long ranges in the Pacific theatre of operations. Some American commentators consider future re-engining possible, for example, using Rolls-Royce engines.

The potential abandonment of NGAD could lead to a dangerously reduced manufacturing capability in the US. The USAF could end up with only one company designing and producing fighters: Lockheed Martin. NGAD (and the similar F/A-XX, successor to the F/A-18 Super Hornet) was supposed to offer opportunities for other manufacturers, especially Boeing, which is already struggling with different problems.

At the end of July, USAF Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin presented the concept of a lighter machine, referred to as "build to adapt," meaning ease of introducing modifications as needed. This is just a theoretical concept of a light fighter (actually a multi-role aircraft), about which little is known except that adaptability to new battlefield conditions is to be more critical than high survivability (so crucial for many older machines, but also NGAD).

Gen. Allvin suggested the necessity of widely using digital engineering and 3D printing during the development and production of the new aircraft. The airplane in the conceptual drawing strongly resembles the F-35, maintaining its overall structural layout with differently configured air intakes and likely smaller dimensions.

It would still be an pretty advanced machine but much cheaper. This would allow the aircraft to be replaced with a more modern variant (or even model) more often than today at similar costs. Furthermore, it would enable the mass introduction of the aircraft into service, increasing the overall size of the USAF's combat component – an answer to the relatively numerous Chinese Air Force.

The idea is not new by any means. NGAD started with the concept of relatively fast replacement or easy modernization—according to one early concept, the F-22 was to be replaced by many, not very numerous, types of highly specialized machines. According to the then US Air Force leadership, this was supposed to allow, among other things, cost reduction, which even then (around 2020) did not seem very credible.

The idea of a lighter fighter, complementing the "workhorse" F-35 and the "top" NGAD, is also not new. In 2021, the USAF expressed the need to purchase a "generation 4.5" fighter that would be cheap enough to replace the mass-produced F-16s (unfortunately not managed within the F-35 program) and offer performance sufficient for future battlefields (an open mission system architecture was required, for example).

The natural candidate seemed to be the trainer Boeing/Saab T-7 Red Hawk, which could become the basis for the development of a light combat machine (just as the Korean KAI FA-50 is derived from the T-50 trainer). Still, so far, the USAF has not expressed interest in such a solution. It appears that the USAF wants an aircraft that is simultaneously a genuine combat aircraft and yet cheaper – this was supposed to be the F-35A. Despite exceeding the original financial assumptions due to the excessive complexity of the JSF program (especially the F-35B version), it almost achieved this.

Can you have your cake and eat it, too? No, but perhaps the USAF will manage to find a reasonable compromise over time, as long as the lighter fighter program is not abandoned before it even starts. Experiences from the past do not inspire optimism.

The idea of a light, cheap fighter jet is potentially attractive, as at significantly lower costs, the user receives only slightly lower capabilities, at least on paper. Thus, it is not surprising that this concept repeatedly returns like a boomerang and almost always ends in two ways: those who could afford it preferred to buy genuine combat aircraft, and those who bought light and cheap fighters ended poorly in combat.