USAF faces costly dilemma in pursuit of air dominance

The primary air superiority aircraft of the USAF remains the F-15 Eagle. Despite continuous modernization, it hails from the 1970s and, even in its latest F-15EX variant, does not offer many of the functionalities associated with fifth-generation aircraft. Most notably, it does not possess stealth capabilities.

This issue was first recognized in the 1980s. Through the ATF program, the much more modern F-22 Raptor was developed, offering safer mission execution due to its stealth characteristics, greater cruising speed thanks to supercruise capability, and extremely high maneuverability. Unfortunately, due to budget cuts, the USAF acquired only 187 of these aircraft instead of the planned 750. Consequently, the modernized, now multi-role but still not new F-15 has had to remain a key "workhorse."

Meanwhile, new technologies have emerged: drones, early versions of artificial intelligence, and increasingly powerful radars. To maintain an edge over its competitors, the USA has demanded a new machine: the NGAD.

The NGAD program, initiated in 2014 under the designation IDI, was aimed at creating an entirely new aircraft. It was, in fact, supposed to be an entire air combat system. The concept evolved over time, initially envisioning a "better Raptor," then adopting the philosophy of a "new series of the century," and finally proposing two different combat aircraft (one larger and long-range for the Pacific theater, and a smaller one for European scenarios).

Eventually, the program settled on an extremely advanced, relatively large aircraft with long range, state-of-the-art sensors, and innovative engines. The most significant feature of the NGAD, however, was not its design with numerous stealth features nor its potential unmanned capability through artificial intelligence algorithms.

The NGAD was intended to be the core of an entire air combat system, composed of optionally manned heavy machines and various types of accompanying drones. These drones would enhance the aircraft's capabilities by carrying additional sensors, electronic warfare systems, and armaments, thus increasing the safety of the pilot and the expensive—estimated at up to $300 (CAD 435) million each—manned aircraft.

To date, at least three different test machines have been flown, but their images are unavailable, nor are details about what exactly was tested. It all boils down to costs.

On January 13, 2025, USAF Secretary Frank Kendall stated that the research and development phase of the NGAD program, excluding the separately developed CCA program for supporting unmanned machines, was expected to cost around $20 (CAD 29) billion. Given the tendency to exceed budgets, it would likely be much more.

The aircraft itself was projected, as mentioned earlier, to cost approximately $300 (CAD 435) million, with around 200 units planned for purchase. For comparison, the F-35A costs the American taxpayer about $100 (CAD 145) million, while the new-generation heavy bomber B-21 Raider is expected to cost about $500 (CAD 725) million each.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that a few months ago, the program was paused to verify certain assumptions, scrutinize the rationale behind the projected costs, and assess the planned efficiency of the aircraft. Certainly, the election period did not help: the decision on NGAD's future is one for the new administration. Although it will take office on January 20, right after the elections, one of its key representatives expressed very strong opinions about the USAF's concepts.

In November, Elon Musk, a billionaire, owner of several technology companies, and recently an avid gamer, declared that the future of aviation lies exclusively with drones, and outrightly described buyers of multi-purpose fifth-generation F-35 aircraft as misguided.

Given his close cooperation with President-elect Donald Trump and the anticipated significant role of Musk in the upcoming U.S. administration, these comments sparked lively debate. Most experts received this statement with skepticism. Kendall responded diplomatically, acknowledging Musk's engineering and business achievements but also noting that he is not a "warfighter" and should learn more about this business before making such statements.

Indeed, in the whole NGAD concept (and other concepts of "future air combat systems," such as FCAS/SCAF and GCAP), drones are meant to play a substantial but not leading role. The air forces of most countries still assert that humans are needed near the "front lines" to oversee combat. The future co-chair of the Government Efficiency Department (a Trump-predicted oversight body) will certainly try to influence changes in USAF plans, but how successful will he be?

Considering financial constraints, the NGAD program may indeed undergo a thorough redesign. During Monday's (January 13) speech, Kendall suggested several options.

One option involves creating a smaller and cheaper aircraft, which, according to the USAF Secretary, would be more like a successor to the F-35. Its primary role would be to coordinate operations with unmanned machines rather than independent combat. It could even be an appropriately modified F-35. Success would hinge on reducing weaponry weight to increase fuel capacity, alongside modernizing avionics.

The opposite approach is also conceivable: since the B-21 Raider is relatively inexpensive, already in production, and well-known, and because NGAD was going to be a large and heavy aircraft anyway, perhaps the strategic bomber could serve as an air superiority platform? In October 2024, USAF Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin suggested that the bomber could perform some air combat functions, particularly in managing unmanned aircraft, serving as a hub for them, etc.

Moreover, it could fulfill another classic function. According to the USAF, one alternative to developing successors to the F-22 and F-15 could be focusing on building capabilities for strikes behind enemy lines, including targeting air bases. Destroying aircraft on the ground is even safer than aerial combat.

In this case, the B-21 would simply carry cruise missiles (from the JASSM family, and also strategic LRSO types), supporting the USAF's pursuit of air dominance. Interestingly, the B-21 is expected to optionally carry air-to-air missiles. Thus, instead of a large and expensive air superiority aircraft, the USAF could potentially acquire an even larger and costlier one.

In any case, no departure from manned aircraft is expected in the near future. The challenge lies with the USAF's entire future model of air dominance. At present, it is clear that it will involve a mix of manned and unmanned machines. But which ones? Much will depend on the funding the Pentagon can expect under the new administration, the verification of the NGAD program's assumptions, and which lobbyists will wield influence.

Deputy Kendall, Andrew Hunter, advocates for the continuation of NGAD, pointing out in a recent interview that while the USAF's advantage over its Chinese competitor is currently considerable, the competitor's progress is rapid, and it is conceivable that the Chinese could achieve certain capabilities sooner. What Trump will do about it? The near future will tell.