Ukraine's nuclear ambitions: A deterrent or diplomatic dilemma?

"Kyiv could quickly develop a primitive bomb, similar to the one dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, to deter Russia if the United States cuts off military aid," reported "The Times" in mid-November.

The British newspaper's article was based on the conclusions of Oleksiy Izhak, head of the analysis department at Ukraine's National Institute for Strategic Studies. Izhak merely explored the challenges and potential consequences of a hypothetical restoration of Ukraine's nuclear weapons program.

A few days later, "The New York Times" reported some sensational information. Relying on anonymous sources from the White House, the newspaper suggested that before the end of his term, Joe Biden might want to provide Ukraine with nuclear weapons. These reports were denied by Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor.

Both publications and the reactions to them coincided with Russia's announcement of an updated nuclear doctrine. Vladimir Putin announced it on November 18 at 10:00 AM ET.

It outlines an expanded set of criteria for using nuclear weapons. The new doctrine allows the use of atomic weapons in response to attacks by non-nuclear states (such as Ukraine) that are supported by nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons could also be used in response to significant attacks with conventional weapons, like drones or hypersonic weapons. The doctrine specifically highlights the possibility of responding to threats against the territorial integrity of Russia or its allies, including Belarus.

Kyiv distances itself from talks of rebuilding its nuclear potential. "Ukraine does not intend to create nuclear weapons and will adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," stated Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi on Telegram.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited over 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons and 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (130 UR-100N ballistic missiles, each carrying up to six warheads, and 46 RT-23 missiles with 10 warheads each). Kyiv also had 38 heavy strategic bombers.

At the time, it was the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Because of Ukraine's uncertain political situation, the West pushed for dismantling this arsenal, starting negotiations on the matter in 1992.

Opponents of disarmament in Ukraine argued that possessing nuclear weapons was a guarantee of independence and sovereignty. However, for Kyiv, nuclear weapons were a burden because the control systems remained in Russia, and maintaining the arsenal posed a significant strain on Ukraine's then-limited budget.

Following relatively smooth negotiations, the Budapest Memorandum was signed in 1994, which promised the "independence and sovereignty" of Ukraine's existing borders in exchange for dismantling the atomic arsenal. The signatories agreed not to "threaten or use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine." The guarantors included the USA, the UK, and Russia.

The arsenal was to be transported to the Russian Federation, where the carriers and warheads were dismantled under international supervision. The last warhead was sent to Russia in June 1996.

In 2010, during a nuclear security summit in Washington, Ukraine committed to disposing of highly enriched uranium. The material, totalling approximately 234 kilograms, was transferred to Russia between 2010 and 2012 with the USA's involvement. In doing so, Kyiv fulfilled another obligation related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and efforts toward nuclear security.

By annexing Crimea and starting the conflict in Donbas, Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum. The full-scale war that erupted in 2022 further breached the memorandum.

At that time, discussions among Ukrainian politicians re-emerged over whether giving up atomic weapons was a mistake. At the war's onset, this was mentioned by, among others, Oleksiy Danilov, then Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, who was dismissed in the spring of 2024. He stated that Ukraine needs an alliance with a nuclear power like the United Kingdom, emphasizing the need for an effective defence system against Russian aggression. He distanced himself from the notion that Ukraine is considering building nuclear weapons.

More radical was Oleksiy Arestovych, a former advisor to President Zelensky. In 2023, he claimed that creating Ukraine's own nuclear weapons would be feasible. He said, "Obtaining enriched uranium takes some time. But such things happen. You never know where uranium might be. Sometimes you're just walking, and suddenly there's a barrel of uranium lying there."

The removal of highly enriched uranium from Ukraine means the country lacks the necessary materials to build an atomic bomb. It's unlikely they'd stumble upon uranium by chance. Nevertheless, they possess considerable plutonium resources, although utilizing them may be problematic.

As Pavel Podvig, an expert on arms control and nuclear security at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, noted, "Ukraine has seven metric tonnes of plutonium, which could be used to build hundreds of warheads. However, all this plutonium is in spent fuel. To extract it, a processing facility is needed, which Ukraine does not possess."

Some voices suggest this scenario is realistic. Maj. Oleksiy Hetman, a prominent military expert, believes Ukraine has the technology, specialists, and uranium needed to create an atomic bomb. He stated, "Two months is quite a realistic timeline." Mariana Budjeryn, a researcher at the Belfer Center at Harvard Kennedy School, argues that Ukraine could carry out a nuclear weapons development program at the Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research.

These statements are more journalistic than realistic assessments. The program's cost, the time needed to build a bomb, and the lack of proper delivery systems would lead to squandered resources and means crucial for expanding the armed forces.

Additionally, Russia would not remain passive, and actions to establish a nuclear arsenal by Ukraine would undoubtedly prompt a response from the Kremlin. The Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research could become a target for Russian attacks, similar to the Taleghani 2 nuclear research center in Iran which faced Israeli attacks.

While theoretically possible, building a Ukrainian nuclear warhead remains unrealistic in practice. Zelensky's comments to Donald Trump in October don't change that: "What options do we have? Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons as a defence, or we must join an alliance like NATO." He also quickly clarified that no nuclear weapons work is underway.