Turkstream tensions: Europe’s last Russian gas lifeline at risk

The security of the TurkStream gas pipeline is a priority for Russia today. On January 11th, the Ministry of Defence announced that Ukraine had attempted to destroy the compressor station in the Krasnodar region using drones. This station pumps Russian gas into the TurkStream system, prompting a swift response from the Kremlin.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called attacks on gas infrastructure a crime and blamed the United States for being behind the Ukrainian action. Neither Washington nor Kyiv has commented on these allegations.

Concerns over the possibility of interrupting the gas flow through this line have also surfaced in other capitals. Both Hungary and Slovakia responded. Hungary's Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto described the incident as an attack on sovereignty, and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico set off on a mission to Turkey. Why is TurkStream so critical?

After the expiration of the agreement to transit Russian natural gas through Ukrainian territory, and Kyiv's firm refusal to extend it, TurkStream became the last gateway for Russian gas to the European market.

The gas currently flows into the EU through pipelines from Turkey to Bulgaria at two points. The vast majority (over 90%) is transported from Russia via the underwater TurkStream pipeline, reaching Bulgaria at the Strandja 2 point. A smaller portion of Turkish exports comprises Russian gas brought in by the underwater Blue Stream pipeline and transmitted to Bulgaria at the Strandja point, explains Dr. Kamil Lipiński from the Polish Economic Institute.

TurkStream consists of two segments, with a total capacity of about 31 billion cubic metres of gas annually. Each line can transmit about 15.5 billion cubic metres. The first line delivers gas from Russia across the Black Sea to the European part of Turkey, and the second line serves the markets of Southern and Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria, Greece, and North Macedonia). This route is also utilized by Hungary and Austria, and Slovakia is seeking to increase supplies to replace gas previously imported through Ukraine.

As Dr. Lipiński notes, in the first half of 2024, the utilization level of Turkish transit capacity was 69%, rising to 79% in the second half of 2024, including 86% in the TurkStream pipeline.

- In the first three weeks of January 2025, Russian gas transfer possibilities from Turkey reached 82% utilization. This is significantly more than January 2024's 66%. Although there's potential for increased transfer, it's limited, especially since the gas must later be routed through Bulgarian, Serbian, and Hungarian systems, he noted.

About 37% of Russian-origin gas continues to enter the EU via TurkStream, with the entry point at Strandja 2 in Bulgaria.

This intersection highlights where various interests converge. For Moscow, it is a crucial channel to sell gas to Europeans, aiding a budget strained by war and sanctions. After the NordStream 2 project's failure, damage to NordStream 1, cessation of supplies through Yamal (end of December 2022), the closure of the Ukrainian route, and sanctions on Russian LNG, the Turkish route is the sole remaining access.

For Hungary, it's a significant source of affordable resources. According to Reuters, citing information disclosed by Szijjarto, Hungary received approximately 6.7 billion cubic metres of gas through TurkStream in 2024. Therefore, the PIE expert argues that most Russian gas imported via TurkStream will not reach Slovakia.

Bulgaria and Serbia, also using Russian supplies, benefit from its transit, but in 2023, Serbia moved toward independence from Gazprom's monopoly, opting for supplies from Azerbaijan.

Ultimately, it's within this southern gateway that Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico places his hopes. This country is nearly entirely dependent on imports of natural gas. Domestic production covers barely 1% of the demand, which averages about 5 billion cubic metres of gas annually. Until now, Russia has played a key role as a supplier.

Slovakia has an agreement with Moscow, signed with Gazprom, covering deliveries until 2028. These were expected to flow steadily through Ukraine via the southern "Friendship" mainline.

The Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod gas pipeline, with an entry point at Sudzha, capable of pumping up to 39 million cubic metres of gas daily, will be closed to Russian resources. Previously, it accounted for 35% of Slovak imports from Russia. In response, the government in Bratislava agreed from 2022 to pay Moscow in rubles based on Putin's demands.

After Kyiv halted supplies, the Prime Minister criticized Ukraine, even issuing an ultimatum to cut its electricity supply unless deliveries resumed. Fico eventually met with Putin, reportedly receiving assurances in the Kremlin that Russia would honour the agreement, despite transit issues through Ukraine.

However, alternative routes via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary are now crucial.

Although Slovakia theoretically has other avenues through which it could secure gas for its own needs, such as the Czech Republic, Germany, or even Poland, it seeks to avoid these options. They would result in losing the profitable role as a transit state and Russian resources remain less expensive.

TurkStream, even if it supplies gas, will not replace Slovakia's substantial earnings from the transit of Russian gas, historically sent by Gazprom through Ukrainian and Slovakian territory to Central and East-Central Europe, estimated at 400-500 million euros annually, notes Dr. Lipiński.

After visiting Moscow, Robert Fico went to Ankara on January 20 to seek the assistance of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. According to Bloomberg, Erdogan agreed to mediate negotiations between Slovakia and Russia to find a resolution.

- Let's take a step, Erdogan stated during a joint press conference in Ankara. He assured Robert Fico that Turkey's foreign minister would contact Russia, while he himself would speak with President Vladimir Putin. - Let's reach a conclusion on Slovakia’s natural gas needs, he assured.

This marks a significant opportunity for Erdogan, who has long aspired to establish a major gas hub. Recall that as early as December 2023, he expressed ambitions for Turkey to supply European countries with 30-40 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually.

Erdogan maintained that the potential is even greater since Turkey could, with further agreements, supply the EU market with up to 100 billion cubic metres of gas within a few years. He acknowledged that a portion of this would come from Russian resources.

In reality, there was no ambiguity, as Vladimir Putin personally suggested to Erdogan during a meeting in Astana in October 2022 the idea of constructing a large gas hub in Turkey with a new route to Europe across the Black Sea. Moscow sought to redirect gas traffic lost from the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 routes into the southern corridor. Although the second underwater pipeline wasn't built, Turkey and Russia have signed long-term contracts for natural gas supply.

The trajectory set by Brussels calls for abandoning Russian gas. New sanctions on Moscow cut previous links. Turkey aims to ensure its "package" includes not only Russian resources but also gas from other suppliers like Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, or LNG from the USA.

What seemed unattainable two years ago appears to be taking shape today. By seeking Russian gas from Turkey, Slovakia is fulfilling the aims of Erdogan and Putin.