Russia's waning influence: Implications of losses in Syria

Tatiana Kolesnychenko: Over the past ten years, Russia has invested enormous resources in maintaining Bashar al-Assad's regime. Meanwhile, it took less than two weeks for the Kremlin's "Syrian project" to collapse like a house of cards. Can we talk about Putin's failure?

Ivan Preobrazhensky: Regarding building influence in the Middle East, yes. This is a failure for the Kremlin. It resulted from several serious mistakes.

Which ones?

First, the exclusive military alliance with Iran. The Kremlin thought it was a highly beneficial arrangement because Iran was helping Russia in Ukraine by providing drones. However, by not maneuvering between Sunnis and Shiites, Moscow failed to notice that it was losing other influential allies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The result was that the interests of not so much Russia but Iran were protected in the region. When Putin began the invasion of Ukraine, he had to rely solely on Tehran because the Russian army was not in a position to support Assad seriously.

Another turning point was allowing Yevgeny Prigozhin to transform Russian military bases in Syria into a logistical hub for the Wagner Group. It served as a base for further operations in Africa, where Russia was deeply entrenched.

According to some analysts, the fact that his key allies did not have the strength to help him played a key role in the downfall of Assad's regime. Russia is engaged in the war in Ukraine, and Iran—as you mentioned in one of your articles—has effectively lost its network of influence in the Middle East. But the ultimate failure was sealed by the absence of Prigozhin, who had built the entire logistics network. After his death, the empire he created was divided and fragmented.

I think Prigozhin's absence had a very significant impact on what just happened. He established a foothold in Syria and built influence in Africa. The Kremlin is now only taking advantage of what the Wagner Group achieved. Prigozhin was able to make radical decisions, build mafia connections, and find common ground with African and Middle Eastern rulers and warlords, who often themselves constituted criminal or semi-criminal structures. Take Assad, whom Prigozhin surely collaborated with on the drug trade and smuggling.

After Prigozhin was eliminated, Russia tried to maintain the remnants of the Wagnerian empire. It created the so-called African Corps, which was neither a state nor a commercial military structure. At the same time, Russia heavily invested and engaged in the African region, particularly in the so-called Sahel (the southern edge of the Sahara, from Senegal to Eritrea, through Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan - ed.). Russian companies' money, large interests, and commitments to Chinese businesses, which these semi-private structures were supposed to protect, are located there.

Now it all stands in question.

Because it's uncertain what will happen with the Russian bases in Syria, Moscow had a 49-year lease on the airbase in Hmeimim and the naval base in Tartus. There are reports that Russia has already evacuated some equipment and personnel. On one hand, rebel leaders say that Russian bases are not under threat, but on the other, we see them stepping on and burning Russian flags.

After the Wagnerians demonstratively showed — because they recorded it on camera — the dismemberment of Syrians, it is not surprising that many dislike Russia's presence. Moscow helped Assad carry out if not genocide — because it did not target a specific ethnic or national group — then at least the destruction of the local population. Such things are not easily forgotten.

On the other hand, it's unclear how susceptible the new Syrian authorities will be to corruption. There is little hope that they will resist corruption, just as there should be no expectation of transparent or democratic governance. It is unlikely that the so-called secular opposition, which started the protests against Assad in 2011, will now play a significant role. So Russia may buy the new government and try to maintain the bases in Syria. But it still will not be a haven for the Kremlin.

While it may be possible to defend the port of Tartus until a complete evacuation, protecting the airbase in Hmeimim poses a problem. Even if the Kremlin maintains the bases, it will still search for an additional haven in the region.

For example, where?

That's the main question. The only potential option is Libya, where there is a simmering civil war and pro-Russian forces. But to get there, Russia will still need another transshipment base. Where? Maybe Turkey or Azerbaijan. But I can't imagine any of these countries agreeing to it.

So consequently, Russia will gradually lose its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

This will entail a whole series of consequences. First, the Kremlin cannot fulfill its commitments to African regimes that expect support. This is a whole group of military juntas oriented towards Moscow. There will be a problem with China, for whom Russia in Africa acts as a protector and helper.

In addition, it is a strong blow to Russia's image. The Kremlin put a lot of effort into creating an image of an anti-colonial power fighting against old empires that exploit Africa. The Soviet Union once pursued a similar policy. Russia expected that with a foothold in Africa, it would further expand its influence over the so-called Global South (countries in Africa, Asia, or South America).

Assad asked for help, but Moscow refused. So is it a signal to other dictators that the Kremlin shouldn't be trusted?

The situation here is more complicated. Russia straightforwardly signals, and — interestingly — Iran repeats it, that Assad himself is to blame because he tried to betray them. In the Kremlin's version, when Assad started experiencing problems, instead of relying on his allies — Russia and Iran — he secretly sought contacts with the West through Persian Gulf countries. The West did not provide Assad with assistance, which is why his regime fell.

And yet Russia provided asylum to Assad and his family.

No one else wanted them. Nevertheless, the Kremlin signals that the fall of the Syrian regime was a punishment for betrayal. It tries to obscure the obvious fact with this twisted narrative that neither Iran nor Russia had the strength or resources to help Assad.

The conclusions are supposed to be simple: don't change sides. But does the Kremlin's version sound credible to African countries and their warlords?

I strongly doubt it. This version is very convenient for the Kremlin, but there is another one: Assad tried to betray his allies when he realized that no one would come to his aid.

If it is perceived this way, it will be a serious blow to Russia's reputation, which has portrayed itself as a power that supports all authoritarian regimes and is always ready to come to the rescue when these regimes fight the West or suppress democratic revolutions.

So Russia will have to reinvent its external image because it no longer fits the old one. Besides, it's a loss of big money, as Russia had very lucrative contracts in Africa, including for oil extraction. And most importantly: now Russia itself is in the situation where it placed the West in recent years.

In what way?

Russia created a series of problems by sowing chaos in countries where the West had some influence, and this weakened it economically. A good example is France, which was ousted by Russia from Africa. Now the Kremlin finds itself in that role, as its projects abroad are collapsing, and it doesn't have the strength to maintain all fronts. So the Kremlin loses its role as a dealer of instability and fear. This vision was actively sold to the West. Putin clearly expected that when Trump became president, he would use Syria and Russian influence in the Middle East as a pretext for normalizing relations. Now that influence is gone.

The withdrawal of Russia from Syria is unlikely to directly impact the front in Ukraine, but it may significantly change the diplomatic battlefield. The question is how?

The most important thing has already happened. It's about the psychological effect. By a fortunate coincidence, while Assad's regime was collapsing, there was a meeting between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, organized by French President Emmanuel Macron. In essence, it was an informal summit after which Trump made a very important statement. Paraphrasing: "Look, Vladimir Putin, you were defeated in Syria and you may suffer a similar defeat in Ukraine. So better think and start negotiating."

This was a statement from a position of strength, to which the Kremlin reacted nervously because it realizes that from a public point of view, the situation suddenly and drastically changed.

Russia no longer looks as strong and omnipotent?

It doesn't. And that's the trick. Putin is not yet losing the war in Ukraine, but Russia has already stopped being perceived as a geopolitical power. Now, we should expect that Moscow will launch another terrorist attack in Ukraine, strike some very vulnerable places with missiles, to show strength again and spread fear and terror.

It's all about creating the impression that the situation is so hopeless that you have to negotiate with the Kremlin and make concessions. Talks are inevitable anyway, but in what mood will everyone sit at the negotiating table? The Kremlin will no longer be able to speak from a position of strength.