Putin proposes alarming changes to Russian nuclear doctrine

The current Russian nuclear doctrine is based on a presidential decree, which outlines the principles of nuclear deterrence. Vladimir Putin signed it on June 2, 2020, developing the principles set out in the 2014 war doctrine.

It was developed in response to the geopolitical situation Russia found itself in after the annexation of Crimea and the secession of Donbas and Luhansk. The presidential decree emphasizes that the nuclear arsenal is the fundamental tool of Moscow's deterrence.

It may be used not only in response to a nuclear attack but also in a situation where a conventional attack threatens the existence of Russia or its allies or threatens to destroy Russian capabilities for a retaliatory nuclear strike. In practice, this underlines the importance of the nuclear arsenal, which is seen by Russians themselves as the guarantor of the state's existence.

As noted in one of its analyses by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the rules for the use of Russian nuclear weapons are so general that potential adversaries cannot be certain of the threshold conditions after crossing which Moscow may use them.

This concerns, for example, the lack of definition of what constitutes allied states for Russia, in whose defence nuclear weapons could be used. At the same time, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is quite high for Russia – granting itself greater freedom in the use of nuclear weapons, for example, by France.

As recently as 2023, Putin publicly declared that the current doctrine is completely sufficient for Russia. During a meeting of the international Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi by the Black Sea, the head of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, Sergei Karaganov, raised the issue of nuclear doctrine, which he considered outdated and not adapted to the current situation.

Quoted by Defence 24, the Russian president’s response was unequivocal: "Why? There is no situation today that threatens Russian statehood and the existence of the Russian state." It appears that since then Putin has changed his mind.

He expressed this as early as mid-2024, when during a visit to Vietnam, he stated that the West aims for a strategic defeat of Russia on the battlefield, which would equal – according to Putin – the end of Russian statehood.

This statement was confirmed at the beginning of September when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov announced that in response to Western actions (i.e., aid to Ukraine), the Russian nuclear doctrine would be changed. These announcements were shortly thereafter concretized by Putin.

During a session of the Russian Federation Security Council, the Kremlin leader proposed expanding the conditions for using the nuclear arsenal. According to the revised doctrine, an attack from a non-nuclear country supported by a nuclear power will also be grounds for this.

This is a clear reference to the realities of the war in Ukraine, which – although it has weapons from the United States, France, or the United Kingdom, among others – is not free to use them to attack targets on Russian territory but seeks to gain such a possibility.

Putin’s declaration is also a confirmation of how serious the fear among Russian decision-makers is regarding the possibility of Ukrainians attacking Russian targets with Western long-range weapons.

The proposals discussed at the Kremlin are accompanied by a change in the narrative presented by local propaganda. Until recently, the Russian army was supposed to be the second in the world, invincible and equipped with the best weapons with "no analogues in the world".

This is no longer accurate. In a programme broadcast by the public television channel Rossiya 1, Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov hosted military expert, retired Colonel Mikhail Khodaryonok.

Solovyov’s guest, known for his matter-of-fact, far removed from Kremlin propaganda comments on the war in Ukraine, unequivocally stated that Russia’s chances of winning a conventional war with NATO are zero.

This can be seen as preparing the public for an unfavourable outcome for Moscow in the war in Ukraine, but these words also explain to Russians why the current, rather cautious nuclear doctrine needs – according to the Kremlin – to be changed.

In this context, it is worth emphasizing that even after their introduction, Putin will not be able to start a nuclear war by pressing the symbolic "red button".

Control over the Russian nuclear arsenal is the responsibility of the Cheget communication system (part of a larger government communication network, Kazbek), represented visibly by black briefcases with communication terminals. At least three people have them – the president, the minister of defence and the chief of the general staff.

According to currently available information, launching the nuclear arsenal requires the decision of two out of three or – according to other sources – all the briefcase holders, and the order passes through several (probably at least seven) layers of the command chain.

An alternative to the order issued through the Cheget system is Russia's "dead hand" – the mechanism for the automatic launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which is supposed to operate in the event of the destruction of Russian decision-making centres.

This role is attributed to the somewhat mythical Perimeter system. Although its existence has been confirmed, there are few reliable reports less than 20 years old about it. There is not even certainty whether Perimeter has been activated, and the principles of its operation or the scale of any automatic nuclear attack remains in the realm of speculation.