BMPT Terminator: From battlefield promise to costly illusion

This vehicle, referred to as the BMPT Terminator, appears capable of dominating the battlefield. Built on the chassis of the T-72 tank, it is reasonably well-armoured. Thanks to the use of an unmanned turret, the crew positions are located low in the hull, increasing their safety.

The BMPT Terminator is also heavily armed with two 30-mm cannons, two 40-mm grenade launchers, a machine gun, and four Ataka-T anti-tank guided missile launchers. This arsenal theoretically allows effective combat at distances ranging from a few dozen metres to several kilometres with various opponents—from tanks and other armoured vehicles to infantry soldiers.

The vehicle is sized and weighted like a tank, measuring about 7 metres long and weighing 48,000 kilograms, accommodating a crew of five soldiers. The BMPT Terminator is also an excellent example of how misleading technical data tables can be.

This vehicle, which has no equivalents in the world, performed well in combat against Syrian militants. Still, in the European battlefield, saturated with modern weapons, it has turned out to be a costly misadventure. On the pages of Wirtualna Polska, we have highlighted this for years, but now—after more than two years of war in Ukraine—even the Russians themselves acknowledge it.

Where did the idea for such equipment originate? Attempts to create a vehicle with these characteristics began in the USSR as early as the 1980s, based on experiences from Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery systems were used against opponents positioned high on mountain slopes or canyon walls, capable of elevating their weapon barrels at a steep angle.

However, the direct cause of the development of the Terminator is considered to be the first Chechen war. During the infamous New Year's Eve assault on Grozny from 1994 to 1995, Russian armoured columns advanced into the city, ahead of the infantry units that were supposed to cover them.

The unprotected tanks and other armoured vehicles were destroyed among urban buildings by Chechen units using simple, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers. In just a few dozen hours, the Russians lost almost 1,500 soldiers, as well as around 180 tanks and other armoured vehicles.

The course of the fighting also indicated that anti-aircraft systems with rapid-firing cannons, such as the ZSU-23-4 Shilka or 2K22 Tunguska, were very effective in repelling Chechen attacks. However, they were quickly destroyed due to their poor armour.

Based on these experiences, the Russians decided to develop a vehicle that would be as well-armoured as tanks and capable of accompanying them in combat to provide support and protection. This is how the heavy tank support combat vehicle Terminator was created.

Despite appearances, the construction of the Terminator is not an example of Russian industry strength but rather a testament to its limitations. To support their tanks, the Russians required a special, separately designed vehicle, which in combat serves a similar role to modern Western infantry fighting vehicles.

Instead of a wide range of weapons, a single 30- to 40-mm cannon suffices, alongside anti-tank missile launchers. However, the cannon must shoot programmable ammunition and be equipped with a modern fire control system, good sensors, and effective stabilization, facilitating accurate fire on the move.

Although the Terminator's combat debut in Syria seemed successful, its use in Ukraine has provided vastly different experiences. The Terminator, whose firepower is undeniable, has proven unexpectedly inept in combat.

As noted by Yevgeny Fedorov, the author of the Topwar.ru website, this partly results from a shift in Russian tank warfare tactics. Tanks are now primarily used as "sniper artillery," engaging in combat from a distance away from immediate threats posed by Ukrainian infantry.

At the same time, tanks usually have "space armour," like roofs, nets, or grates that hinder FPV drone attacks. Meanwhile, the Terminator cannot cover the turret if it wants to maintain its capabilities. This leads to another problem.

As noted by the Russian author, the tank's main armament and some of its sensors are protected by the turret's solid armour. Meanwhile, the Terminator's sensors and weapons are housed in an external, unmanned module. They are vulnerable to damage even without direct hits, merely from nearby explosions.

As a result, even inaccurate shelling can render the Terminator "blind and deaf" due to electronic malfunctions, making it unable to continue fighting and an easy target for destruction. To make matters worse, the Terminator is only slightly cheaper than a main battle tank and, at the same time, harder to repair and produce. Although it uses a popular tank chassis, this chassis requires significant modifications.

Another issue is the numerous crew. To fully exploit its firepower, the BMPT Terminator must be manned by a five-person crew, with two soldiers operating the 40-mm grenade launchers. The author of Topwar.ru poses the question of whether it's better to train five crews (15 people) for universal tanks or three crews for a vehicle that may only be useful under certain circumstances.

All these factors make the BMPT Terminator—although in theory, a powerful weapon—in practice a military shell whose significance, initially stressed by pro-Kremlin media, has not been confirmed on the battlefield.

Thus, the heavy tank support combat vehicle is added to the lengthy list of "Putin's parade equipment”—weapons touted by Russian propaganda as the best globally and prominently featured at military parades, yet proven ineffective on the Ukrainian battlefield.